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NOTES
The Duty to Update Corporate

Emissions Pledges
Facingboth internal and external market pressures, a rapidly growing
number of private companies are making public, voluntary, and ambitious
pledges to reduce or outright eliminate by a certain date or benchmark their

greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, ambition and necessity notwithstanding,
nonfulfillment of these emission reduction targets ("ERTs") is a looming, if not
an already realized, concern for markets, which are noticeably and increasingly
attuned to the long-term value and climate performance of companies. In the
absence of a comprehensive disclosure regime for climate performanceand risk,

this Note highlights the duty to update-a judicial doctrine that polices
forward-looking statements, like ERTs, that become misleading over time-as
a bulwark against unfulfilled ERTs that linger in the market and have the
potential to mislead investors concerning a company's climate performance or

reputation. In fact, ERTs-which convey clear expectations regarding the
quantity of emissions to be reduced, the steps needed to achieve those reductions,
and the timeframe of achievement-are uniquely suitablefor the duty to update.
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INTRODUCTION

Anthropogenic climate change is undeniably an era-defining
challenge, with assessments of its causes and impacts growing
evermore definitive. 1 Meanwhile, the window to avoid the worst effects
See, e.g., LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
1.
CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT 5 (Core Writing Team, Rajendra K. Pachauri & Andy

Reisinger eds., 2008), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4_syr_fillreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NFB7-NPUV] ("Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures
since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG
concentrations."); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for Policymakers,
in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT 2, 4, 8 (2014), https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-

that
(noting
[https://perma.cc/78ZV-LB6R]
report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINALSPM.pdf
anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions "ha[ve] led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years" and
"[c]ontinued emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting
changes ... increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and
ecosystems"). There are assuredly many other reports issued by governments, academia,
nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs"), and the private sector that highlight the connection
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of climate change is quickly closing. 2 With the outlook admittedly bleak,
the 2015 Paris Agreement provided a glimmer of hope, as almost two
hundred nations made commitments to "hold[ ] the increase in the
global average temperature to well below 2 *C above pre-industrial
levels and pursu[e] efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 1C." 3

At the time, the United States was viewed by many as a progressive
player in the negotiations, pushing for more ambitious international
targets, 4 a noticeable and game-changing departure from the country's
prior reluctance to fully commit to similar international agreements. 5
This glimmer of hope was dimmed-if not outright
extinguished-when the Trump Administration reversed course by
between human activities and climate change. But the question of climate change has long ceased
to be one of problem definition, and lending credence to a nonexistent debate would only detract
from devising and implementing necessary and aggressive climate action.
2.

See MYLES ALLEN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary

for Policymakers, in SPECIAL REPORT: GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5*C 1, 12 (V. Masson-Delmotte et al.
eds., 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/srl5/chapter/spm/ [https://perma.cc/NXP9-KRLH] (stating that in
order to have a reasonable chance of not exceeding a 1.5'C temperature increase, emissions must
decrease "45% from 2010 levels by 2030").
3.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, in Rep. of
the Conf. of the Parties on the Twenty-First Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1 (Dec. 12,
2015). It should be noted that the differences between a 1.5*C and a 2*C scenario are stark, to say
the very least: heatwave duration (1.1 months vs. 1.5 months), reduction in freshwater availability
in the Mediterranean and similar regions (9% vs. 17%), increase in global heavy precipitation
intensity (5% vs. 7%), total global sea level rise by 2100 (40 cm vs. 50 cm), rate of sea level rise
between 2081 and 2100 (4 mm/year vs. 5.5 mm/year), fraction of global reefs at risk of annual
bleaching by 2050 (90% vs. 98%), decrease in global maize production (1% vs. 6%). Carl-Friedrich
Schleussner et al., Differential ClimateImpacts for Policy-Relevant Limits to Global Warming: The
Case of 1.5 "C and 2 *C, 7 EARTH SYS. DYNAMICS 327, 345 (2016). Even worse, the effects will be
more acute in "particularly vulnerable regions and societal groupings with limited adaptive
capacity," such as the tropical regions of Africa and Southeast Asia, the Mediterranean, and North
Africa. Id. at 344. An Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ("IPCC") report found similar
differences in effects with respect to global species loss (4-8% vs. 8-18%), global land where
ecosystems will shift to a new biome (7% vs. 13%), amount of Arctic permafrost at risk of thaw (4.8
vs. 6.6 million square kilometers), and reduction in global marine-fisheries production (1.5 vs. 3
million tons). See Kelly Levin, Half a Degree and a World Apart: The Difference in Climate Impacts
Between 1.5'C and 2'C of Warming, WORLD RES. INST. (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.wri.org/
blog/2018/10/half-degree-and-world-apart-difference-climate-impacts-between -15-c-and-2-cwarming [https://perma.cc/RVQ7-7HKS] (summarizing the IPCC's report). Half a degree can make
a bigger difference than one might think.
4.
See Karl Mathiesen & Fiona Harvey, Climate CoalitionBreaks Cover in Paristo Push for
Binding and Ambitious Deal, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2015, 3:19 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2015/dec/08/coalition-paris-push-for-binding-ambitious-climate-change-deal
[https://perma.cc/QE4Y-HR5F] (discussing how the United States formed part of the "high
ambition coalition" at the Paris talks that pushed for, among other things, a legally binding
agreement, long-term goals in line with science, and a system to review and track each
nation's progress).
5.
See generally Joyeeta Gupta, A History of InternationalClimate Change Policy, 1 WIRES
CLIMATE CHANGE 636 (2010) (providing a detailed account of the United States' involvement in
the early phases of international climate negotiations, particularly noting the United States'
failure to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, preference for agreements with a limited set of nations, and
underwhelming emissions reduction commitments in the Copenhagen Accords).
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6
withdrawing the United States from the Paris Agreement and rolling
back the climate policies and regulations enacted under the Obama
Administration. 7 Yet as the U.S. government took a lamentable step
back, the private sector, alongside subnational governments, noticeably
stepped forward. Publicly, major corporations, including Apple and
Morgan Stanley, took out full-page advertisements in the New York
Times urging President Trump to keep the United States in the Paris
Agreement. 8 Behind the scenes, companies, usually working alongside
nongovernmental organizations, have reaffirmed their commitment to
the Paris Agreement, irrespective of the Trump Administration's

decision on the matter. 9

In affirming their commitment to combating climate change,
many companies are utilizing an important but nevertheless surprising
tool: voluntary emissions reductions targets ("ERTs"). An ERT is
essentially a company's commitment to reduce or offset its greenhouse
10
entirely or by a certain percentage, by a
gas ("GHG") emissions,

Valerie Volcovici, U.S. Submits Formal Notice of Withdrawal from Paris Climate Pact,
6.
REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-climate-usa-paris/ussubmits-formal-notice-of-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-pact-idUSKBN1AK2FM
[https://perma.cc/99WS-EUYZ].
See, e.g., David Shepardson, Trump Finalizes Rollback of Obama-Era Vehicle Fuel
7.
Efficiency Standards, REUTERS (Mar. 31, 2020, 9:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaautos-emissions/trump-finalizes-rollback-of-obama-era-vehicle-fuel-efficiency- standardsidUSKBN21I25S [https://perma.cc/5B2M-9HR5]; Jeff Tollefson, Trump Administration Relaxes
Emissions Limits on Power Plants, SCI. AM. (June 20, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/
[https://perma.cc/JLD5article/trump-administration-relaxes-emissions-limits-on-power-plants/
X9WM].
See Daniel Victor, 'Climate Change Is Real': Many U.S. Companies Lament ParisAccord
8.
Exit, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/business/climate-changethese
(discussing
[https://perma.c/4GXN-K7DH]
tesla-corporations-paris-accord.html
advertisements). These calls to stay in the Paris Agreement continued into the Trump
Administration. Oliver Balch, 75 CEOs Call for U.S. to Stay in the ParisAgreement as Emissions
Continue to Rise, REUTERS EVENTS (Dec. 4, 2019), https://www.reutersevents.com/sustainability/
[https://perma.cc/D4PH-3ZWY]
75-ceos-call-us-stay-paris-agreement-emissions-continue-rise
(discussing a statement signed by the head of the AFL-CIO and the CEOs of companies like Royal
Dutch Shell, Total, Apple, Google, and Goldman Sachs urging President Trump to rescind the
United States' withdrawal from the Paris Agreement).
See, e.g., One Year Later, Companies and Investors Are 'Still In' the Paris Agreement,
9.
CERES (June 1, 2018), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/press-releases/one-year-later-companies
-and-investors-are-still-paris-agreement [https://perma.cc/9VLY-TP27] (highlighting the private
actors working to uphold the goals of the Paris Agreement).
10. This Note uses "GHG emissions," "carbon emissions," and "emissions" interchangeably.
While this is admittedly incorrect as a scientific matter-there are several types of greenhouse
gas, not all of which contain the element carbon nor have the same global warming potential as
carbon dioxide-it reflects how many companies, and the market more generally, use the terms as
fungible. A more accurate shorthand is "carbon dioxide equivalent," or CO2e, which essentially
converts any quantity of any greenhouse gas into an amount of carbon dioxide that would have the
same global warming impact. But not all companies use this more scientifically accurate
shorthand. See generally MATTHEW BRANDER, GREENHOUSE GASES, C0 2, CO2E, AND CARBON:
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specified deadline. As just one example, PepsiCo committed in January
2021 to reduce its absolute scope 1 and scope 2 GHG emissions by 75%
and its scope 3 GHG emissions by 40% by 2030, according to a 2015 base
year.1 1 These ERTs are typically found in places like press releases,
corporate sustainability reports, and submissions to private (i.e.,
nongovernmental) environmental disclosure regimes like CDPformerly the Carbon Disclosure Project-and the Sustainability
Accounting Standards Board ("SASB"). 12
Yet, as with any ambitious commitment with a hard and, at
times, distant deadline for completion, there are concerns of
nonfulfillment. In fact, evidence already shows that some companies
are not meeting or are not on track to meet their ERTs. 13 Since these
ERTs are entirely voluntary and nonbinding, this risk of nonfulfillment
may not appear to pose a serious problem-aside from the obvious
implications for the global effort to stave off the worst effects of climate
change. But the pronouncement of an ERT, like any statement with a
forward-looking connotation, lingers in the market, a market that is
increasingly taking companies' climate performance seriously. 14 Thus,
absent an explicit update of progress-or at least the disclosure of
emissions data necessary to calculate progress-the market, and the
public more generally, may be unaware that a company is lagging
behind on its publicly disclosed climate goals. This creates a disconnect
between a company's actual climate performance and the market's
perception of such performance, which leads to concerns about the
accuracy of the company's share price, in particular, and market
efficiency, in general. 15
In the context of statements with forward-looking connotations,
federal securities law is not operating from a blank slate. In the context
of forward-looking statements, which pose the risk of becoming
materially deficient or misleading over due time due to subsequent
developments, courts have contemplated a "duty to update" designed to

WHAT Do ALL THESE TERMS MEAN? (2012), https://ecometrica.com/assets/GHGs-C02-CO2e-andCarbon-What-Do-These-Mean-v2.1.pdf [https://perma.ec/2FY7-6DSQ].
11. See PepsiCo Doubles Down on Climate Goal and Pledges Net-Zero Emissions by 2040,
PEPSICO (Jan. 14, 2021), https://www.pepsico.com/news/press-release/pepsico-doubles-down-onclimate-goal-and-pledges-net-zero-emissions-by-204001142021 [https://perma.cc/B2EB-9F8T]. See
infra Section I.B for an explanation of the technical terminology used in this particular ERT.
12. See, e.g., Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J.
923, 944-46 (2019) (documenting how companies disclose climate-related information through
self-issued sustainability reports and through disclosure frameworks promulgated by private
standard setters).

13.
14.
15.

See infra Section I.D.
See infra Section I.A.
See infra Section I.D.2.
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protect investors. 16 While this duty to update has, according to one
commentator, "assumed a mythical status" such that "very few people
have actually seen [it],"17 this Note highlights how the duty to update

doctrine, in the absence of ex ante regulation, can provide at least a
stopgap to police unfulfilled ERTs.

This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I sketches the contours
of ERTs, specifically the market forces driving the proliferation of
ERTs, how the precise terminology of ERTs sets clear market
expectations on reduction potential, and what steps companies are
taking to integrate ERTs into their business model. Part I then

confronts the reality that a company, despite its best intentions, may
not be able to meet its ERT within the proscribed timeline; these
unfulfilled yet lingering ERTs present acute concerns about market
efficiency and price accuracy. Part II shifts to examine how federal
securities law has handled forward-looking statements like ERTs. In
particular, Part II centers on the judicially created "duty to update," a
doctrine that, despite its controversial existence, holds great promise in
ensuring investors are not misled by forward-looking statements that
set clear expectations regarding fundamental business actions. Finally,
Part III employs the duty to update as a temporary bulwark against
unfulfilled ERTs that linger in the market while also exploring
potential limitations and normative implications.
I. CORPORATE EMISSION REDUCTION TARGETS
Traditionally, corporate climate action has been viewed as the
product of marketing departments seeking to sow goodwill without
18
materially altering the company's business model. Today, corporate
climate action is a sophisticated endeavor, and as this Part will
demonstrate, ERTs may be better characterized as core organizational

16. See, e.g., Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc) ("[In special
circumstances, a statement, correct at the time, may have a forward intent and connotation upon
which parties may be expected to rely. If this is a clear meaning, and there is a change, correction,
more exactly, further disclosure, may be called for.").
17. See Gregory S. Porter, What Did You Know and When Did You Know It?: Public Company
Disclosureand the Mythical Duties to Correct and Update, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2199, 2200 (2000).
18. As is often the case with parody, this "all-talk, no-action" attitude is perfectly
encapsulated by the Greenzo character on NBC's 30 Rock, who was marketed as "America's first
non-judgmental, business-friendly environmental advocate." See Matt Brennan, As MPAA
CelebratesEarth Day with 'Eco-ConsciousPractices,'HowGreen Has Hollywood Gone?, INDIEWIRE
(Apr. 23, 2015, 11:33 A.M.), https://www.indiewire.com/2015/04/as-mpaa-celebrates-earth-day[https://perma.cc/594Zwith-eco-conscious-practices-how-green-has-hollywood-gone-187908/
545G]; see also 30 Rock Official, Greenzo Saving the World - 30 Rock, YOUTUBE (Mar. 5, 2020),
(Greenzo
[https://perma.cc/Q5AD-VAW6]
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v-AyMs2xox_hE
attempting to sell GE front-loading washers in the name of environmental protection).
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decisions made by boards of directors and C-suite executives, not
marketing departments. ERTs are the products of organized pressure
from external market actors, and the pledges ultimately use precise
technical language to clearly convey expectations about the quantity of
emissions to be reduced, the timeline for fulfillment, and the
organizational and operational steps that will be taken to reach
fulfillment. Yet the inevitable uncertainty characteristic of any

forward-looking

pledge

increases

the likelihood that despite

a

company's best efforts, an ERT might not be met, which can have
implications for stock prices and overall market efficiency.
A. Proliferation

are

At the outset, it will be helpful to briefly explore why companies
voluntarily setting ambitious ERTs. After all, ERTs are

effectively a form of self-regulation-an

emissions cap set by a

-

company itself, rather than regulators, that often requires significant
investment and divestment to achieve. Such self-regulation appears
antithetical to a traditionally profit-centric1 9 and historically
carbon-intensive economy. 20
While that may have traditionally been the case, several market
drivers-under the umbrella of "private environmental governance" 2 1
are now pushing companies to undertake voluntary climate action.
Louis Leonard has helpfully categorized and summarized several of
these market drivers and their impacts on corporate behavior: (1)
business-to-business pressure, which includes competitive pressures
19. See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919) ("A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders.... [D]iscretion
of directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to attain that end, and does not extend to a
change in the end itself. . . ."); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962)
("[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business-to use its resources and engage in
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game .... "). To
be sure, there are, especially in recent years, contrary views on the role of profits. See, e.g., ALEX
EDMANS, GROW THE PIE: HOW GREAT COMPANIES DELIVER BOTH PURPOSE AND PROFIT 46-47

(2020) (arguing that the purpose of corporations is to create value for society, with the
accumulation of profits serving as a by-product).
20. See Paul K. Gellert & Paul S. Ciccantell, Coal's Persistence in the Capitalist WorldEconomy: Against Teleology in Energy 'Transition" Narratives, 6 SOCIO. DEV. 194, 197 (2020)
(noting that while "the last five to six centuries of capitalist development have expanded the scale
of production exponentially as technologies were developed to exploit coal, then oil and gas, and
then nuclear and renewable sources for power and electricity," transitions away from carbonintensive energy are not and have not been inevitable).
21. See, e.g., Michael Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
129 (2013) (providing an overview of private environmental governance and situating it in the
legal literature); see also Louis G. Leonard III, Under the Radar: A Coherent System of Climate
Governance, Driven by Business, 50 ENV'TL. REP. 10546 (2020) (highlighting prominent literature
on private climate governance).
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within industries and the inclusion of climate issues in supply chain
contracting, like Walmart's Project Gigaton; (2) public pressure, which
advocacy
campaigns,
naming-and-shaming
boycotts,
includes
perceptions
organization pressure, and employee and job candidate
about the company; (3) financial system pressure, whereby investors,

lenders, and insurers seek to either disassociate themselves from
companies with poor climate records or leverage their influence to
achieve changes to a company's internal governance; and (4) evolving
norms, which encompasses efforts to match societal expectations about
climate performance or cultivate internal norms regarding climate
performance. 22 These drivers are not entirely independent, and
interactions are likely to create feedback loops and cascading effects
23
within and among companies in an industry.
The influence of these market actors has created a "business case"
for voluntary climate action, whereby companies have a self-interest in
24
engaging in such action in order to capture financial benefits. Recent
empirical studies have indicated that continued nonabatement of

emissions can become costly for companies in the form of reduced
valuations. 25 Similar research has found correlations between increased
26
transparency on sustainability matters and lower capital constraints,

22. Leonard, supra note 21, at 10552-55; see Maria L. Banda, The Bottom-Up Alternative:
The Mitigation Potentialof PrivateClimate GovernanceAfter the ParisAgreement, 42 HARV. ENV'T
L. REV. 325, 345 (2018) (noting that private climate governance is the result of both "self-interest"
drivers, which are often motivated by external constraints, and "self-identity" drivers, which
pertain to norms and the idea that voluntary climate action is "the right thing to do").
23. See Banda, supra note 22, at 345 ("Actions that begin as simple calculations of
self-interest may over time trigger normative change and become embedded in
organizational practices.").
24. See Leonard, supra note 21, at 10552 (discussing the "business case" for private
climate action).
25. See Chika Saka & Tomoki Oshika, Disclosure Effects, Carbon Emissions and Corporate
Value, 5 SUSTAINABILITY ACCT., MGMT. & POLY J. 22, 38-40 (2014) (finding that disclosure of
carbon management has a positive relation to the market value of equity, with this relationship
growing stronger when the volume of emissions is larger); Ella Mae Matsumura, Rachna Prakash
& Sandra C. Vera-Munoz, Firm-Value Effects of Carbon Emissions and Carbon Disclosures, 89
ACCT. REV. 695, 720-21 (2014) (finding that although firm value decreases, on average, by
$212,000 for every additional thousand metric tons of carbon emissions, voluntary disclosure of
carbon emissions can provide outweighing benefits, as the median value of firms that disclose their
carbon emissions is about $2.3 billion higher than that of comparable non-disclosing firms).
26. See Beiting Cheng, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, Corporate Social Responsibility
and Access to Finance, 35 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1, 2 (2014) ("[F]irms with better [corporate social
responsibility] performance face lower capital constraints."); Charles J. Fombrun, Naomi A.
Gardberg & Michael L. Barnett, Opportunity Platforms and Safety Nets: Corporate Citizenship
and Reputational Risk, 105 BUS. & SOC'Y REV. 85, 85-86 (2000) ("By doing good, managers
generate reputational gains that improve a company's ability to attract resources, enhance its
performance, and build competitive advantage.").
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improved stock performance and earnings, 2 7 and lower risk of
bankruptcy. 28 Further, the influence of external market actors is not
merely hypothetical or a matter of academic theory; companies
are explicitly referencing these financial considerations in their
annual reports. 29
While it would be difficult to ascertain precisely which market
drivers motivate a company to issue an ERT, one thing is clear: the
proliferation of ERTs is staggering-a borderline arms race. In the two
years following the adoption of the Paris Agreement, an average of two
companies per week submitted an ERT to the Science Based Targets
Initiative ("SBTi") 30-a partnership between CDP, the United Nations
Global Compact, World Resources Institute, and the World Wildlife
Fund that assists companies in setting ERTs in line with each
company's particular reduction potential. 3 1 As of publication of this
Note, over 130 U.S. companies have set targets with the SBTi, while
almost 100 more have committed to setting targets. 32 Companies that
have set targets with the SBTi include Pfizer (December 2015), HP
(June 2017), Tyson Foods (August 2018), Nike (August 2019), and

27. See Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate
Sustainability on OrganizationalProcesses and Performance, 60 MGMT. SC. 2835, 2836 (2014)
("Using a four-factor model to account for potential differences in the risk profile of the two groups,
we find that annual abnormal performance is higher for the high sustainability group compared
to the low sustainability group."); see also DOMINIC BARTON, JAMES MANYIKA, TIMOTHY KOLLER,

&

ROBERT PALTER, JONATHAN GODSALL & JOSHUA ZOFFER, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., MEASURING THE
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SHORT-TERMISM 1-2 (2017) (discussing how values-based investing
correlates with returns).
28. SAVITA SUBRAMANIAN, DAN SUZULD, ALEX MAKEDON, JILL CAREY HALL, MARC POUEY
JIMMY BONILLA, BANK OF AM. MERRILL LYNCH, ESG: GOOD COMPANIES CAN MAKE GOOD STOCK

1 (2016).
29. See, e.g., Chevron Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 21 (Feb. 21, 2020) ("Unfavorable
[environmental, social, and corporate governance] ratings may lead to increased negative investor
sentiment toward Chevron and our industry and to the diversion of investment to other industries,
which could have a negative impact on our stock price and our access to and costs of capital.");
PepsiCo, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 30 (Feb. 13, 2020) (noting "increased focus" by
"governmental and non-governmental organizations, investors, customers and consumers" on

climate matters such that "[o]ur reputation can be damaged if we or others in our industry do not
act, or are perceived not to act, responsibly with respect to our impact on the environment").
30. Corporate Climate Action Gathers Unstoppable Pace, Two Years on from the Paris
Agreement, WE MEAN BUS. COAL. (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.wemeanbusinesscoalition.org/press-

release/corporate-climate-action-gathers-unstoppable-pace-two-years-paris-agreement/
[https://perma.cc/3CNX-QV2A]; see also 100+ Global Corporations Commit to Science-Based
Targets Aligned with Paris Agreement, UNFCCC (Apr. 17, 2018), https://unfecc.int/news/100global-corporations-commit-to-science-based-targets-aligned-with-paris-agreement
[https://perma.cc/KRD7-L5NE].
31. See About Us, SCI. BASED TARGETS, https://sciencebasedtargets.org/about-us#who-we-are
(last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/N6WN-353J].
32. See Companies Taking Action, SCI. BASED TARGETS, https://sciencebasedtargets.org/
companies-taking-action (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/47PA-VA23] (listing these
companies, their targets, and their commitments).
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Philip Morris (December 2020).3 3 While the SBTi provides a useful
database, it is by no means exhaustive and does not do the increase in
ERTs justice: worldwide, as of December 2020, more than 1,500
companies-with combined revenues of $12.5 trillion-have set or have
34
pledged to set net-zero targets.
B. Terminology
Now that it is clearer why companies are voluntarily setting
their own ERTs, it is important to dissect exactly what these targets are
trying to convey to the market and the public. In the abstract, it is not
difficult to wrap one's head around these pledges; a reduction in
emissions simply means emissions will decrease, right? Taking a
Walmart press release as an example, the company's pledge to "target[ ]
zero emissions across the company's global operations by 2040" seems
35
pretty straightforward. But then how does that pledge compare to
Microsoft's pledge to become "carbon negative" by 203036 or Amazon's
goal of "reach[ing] net zero carbon by 2040"?37 Are zero emissions,
carbon negative, and net zero all distinct technical concepts, or simply
interchangeable marketing jargon? Does it matter that Walmart's
38
reduction target applies to "the company's global operations" while
Microsoft's program includes both the company's direct emissions and
39
those associated with its value chain?
While those questions are rhetorical, the point is that companies
use a mostly unified set of terminology to communicate the scope and
reduction potential of their ERTs. The target-setting process requires
careful accounting-not entirely unlike financial accounting-of a

33.

Id.

34. See JULIA TURNER, MARK MELDRUM, JEREMY OPPENHEIM, MARLENE KICK & ANNECAROLINE DUPLAT, SYSTEMIQ, THE PARIS EFFECT: HOW THE CLIMATE AGREEMENT IS RESHAPING
2

THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 13 (2020), https://www.systemiq.earth/wp-content/uploads/2020/1 /TheParis-Effect&SYSTEMIQFull-Report_December-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/9A3B-G74H].
35. Press Release, Walmart, Walmart Sets Goal to Become a Regenerative Company 1 (Sept.
21, 2020), https://corporate.walmart.com/media-library/document/walmart-sets-goal-to-become-a7
3
regenerative-company/_proxyDocument?id=00000174-ae8-dcf -a fc-afdca70000
[https://perma.cc/8JKS-KUPY].
36. Brad Smith, Microsoft Will Be Carbon Negative by 2030, MICROSOFT: OFF. MICROSOFT
BLOG (Jan. 16, 2020), https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2020/01/16/microsoft-will-be-carbonnegative-by-2030/ [https://perma.cd/5J38-SDHQ].
37.

AMAZON, ALL IN: STAYING THE COURSE ON OUR COMMITMENT TO SUSTAINABILITY 7 (2020),

https://sustainability.aboutamazon.com/pdfBuilderDownload?name=sustainability-all-indecember-2020 [https://perma.cc/EBG9-SMQA].
38. Walmart, supra note 35, at 1 (emphasis added).
39. See Smith, supra note 36 ("[W]e are launching today an aggressive program to cut our
carbon emissions by more than half by 2030, both for our direct emissions and for our entire supply
and value chain.").
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company's emissions and the reduction capabilities of the company's

business units and, potentially, its entire supply chain. This Section
will pick apart several key aspects of ERTs in an effort to highlight how
precisely these pledges set expectations for reduction potential.
1. Scopes of Emissions
When calculating and reporting GHG emissions, companies
typically divide emissions into three categories: scope 1, scope 2, and
scope 3.40 Scope 1 emissions are direct GHG emissions from sources
owned or controlled by the company (e.g., factories owned and operated
by the company, vehicle fleets). 4 1 Scope 2 emissions are GHG emissions

associated with generated electricity purchased by the company. 42
Scope 3 consists of all other upstream and downstream indirect GHG
emissions not included in scope 2; this category generally includes

emissions associated with a company's supply chain and sold products
but can also include less obvious emissions like business travel,
investments, and leased assets. 43
When setting targets, companies are generally careful to define
which scopes of emissions are covered by a particular target, with many
companies focusing on scope 1 and scope 2 emissions. For example,

ConocoPhillips clearly states that it has set GHG emissions intensity
reduction targets for its "scope 1 and scope 2 emissions," while further

stating that the targets do not cover scope 3 emissions. 44 Looking back
at the Walmart and Microsoft comparison above, Walmart's zero
emissions pledge focuses on the company's global emissions and
explicitly disclaims inclusion of scope 3 emissions, while Microsoft's
negative emissions goal includes scope 3 emissions from its supply and
value chain. 45

40. See WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & WORLD RES. INST., THE GREENHOUSE
GAS PROTOCOL: A CORPORATE AcCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARD 25 (rev. ed. 2004),

https://ghgprotocol.org/sites/default/files/standards/ghg-protocol-revised.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XJ43-SRFJ) (describing the three GHG emission scopes).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. CONOCOPHILLIPS, 2019 SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 60, 80 (2020), https://static.
conocophillips.com/files/resources/conocophillips-2019-sustainability-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RG9Q-8HZJ] ("Our GHG intensity target does not cover scope 3 emissions.").
45. The point of the simplified comparison is to highlight that a company is typically very
careful in determining the coverage of a particular reduction pledge. It should be noted that
Walmart's Project Gigaton, while not explicitly included in the company's "zero emissions" target,
is focused on reducing the company's scope 3 emissions by one gigaton carbon dioxide equivalent
("CO2e") between 2015 and 2030. See Press Release, Walmart, Walmart Launches Project Gigaton
to Reduce Emissions in Company's Supply Chain (Apr. 19, 2017), https://corporate.walmart.com/
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The hesitation to include scope 3 emissions is understandable,
as companies do not always have direct control over those emissions46
although supply contracting can have some effect -and there can be
significant overlap among different companies' categorizations (e.g.,
one company's scope 3 emissions might be another company's scope 1
emissions). 4 7 Regardless, the decision about which emissions to include
in a climate target can have dramatic impacts on the reduction
potential of that target, as scope 3 emissions can account for several
48
times the impact of scope 1 and 2 emissions. As a result, and often due

to external pressures, companies are readily disclosing and pledging to

reduce scope 3 emissions. 49 In sum, this combination of categorization
and disclosure provides the market with a reliable estimation of how
much reduction potential must be realized for a company to meet a
particular ERT.
2. Net Zero, Zero, and Negative Emissions
Relatedly, "net zero," or "carbon neutrality" as it is sometimes
called, is achieved when the GHG emissions emitted by a company are
50
balanced out by GHG emissions removed from the atmosphere. In an
ideal scenario, this would entail limiting emissions to as close to zero as
possible while using carbon removal or capture technologies or carbon

newsroom/2017/04/19/walmart-launches-proj ect-gigaton-to-reduce-emissions-in-companyssupply-chain [https://perma.cc/YDS7-XTQW].
46. See Banda, supra note 22, at 372 ("The power of contracting endows downstream actors
with significant leverage to impose behavioral change through their supply chain."); ALEXANDER
FARSAN, ANDRES CHANG, ANNEMARIE KERKHOF, BENCE CSERNA, CHENDAN YAN, FERNANDO
RANGEL VILLASANA & NICOLE LABUTONG, SCI. BASED TARGETS, VALUE CHANGE IN THE VALUE
CHAIN: BEST PRACTICES IN SCOPE 3 GREENHOUSE GAS MANAGEMENT 25 (2018) (discussing how a

company can use forceful or voluntary supply chain contracting to ensure supplier compliance with
the company's emissions goals).

47. See FARSAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 9 ("Scope 3 emissions do fall outside of the company's
direct control/ownership. It is, therefore, more difficult to collect scope 3 data and the inherent
control and ownership structure can create barriers to reduce these emissions."); see also
CONOCOPHILLIPS, supra note 44, at 80 ("As an exploration and production company with no
downstream assets, we have no control over how the raw materials we produce are transformed

into other products or consumed.").
48. See FARSAN ET AL., supra note 46, at 9 (documenting that scope 3 emissions from "carbon
majors" account for approximately 90% of total company emissions).
49. See id. (noting that "[o]ver 2,800 companies that reported to CDP in 2017 reported scope
3 emissions" and "368 companies publicly listed scope 3 emission reduction targets in their 2017
CDP response").
50. See Kelly Levin & Chantal Davis, What Does "Net-Zero Emissions" Mean? 6 Common
Questions, Answered, WORLD RES. INST.: BLOG (Aug.

12,

2020), https://www.wri.org/blog/

[https://perma.cc/
2019/09/what-does-net-zero-emissions-mean-6-common-questions-answered
2BFX-QXJS] (explaining that the world will achieve net-zero emissions when "human-caused
GHG emissions are balanced out" by removing GHGs from the atmosphere in a process called
carbon removal).
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offsets to mitigate the remaining emissions. 51 In practice, there are
concerns that the two concepts-emissions reduction and emissions
removal-are viewed as entirely fungible options to reduce one's carbon
footprint.5 2 Thus, a company may disregard substantial emissions

reduction in favor of investments in carbon capture, removal, or offsets
for those unmitigated emissions. For example, while several oil
majors-including BP, Shell, and Total-have engaged in an arms race
of climate pledges, many of their programs focus heavily on carbon
removal and capture technologies and offsets while avoiding actual
emissions reductions. 53
In contrast, "zero emission" or "zero carbon" pledges are more
straightforward and entail lowering emissions to zero or as close to zero

as possible, regardless of offsets or carbon capture. "Negative
emissions" is essentially a pledge to both limit emissions to zero (or close
to it) and capture or offset enough atmospheric carbon to create a
net negative carbon profile. Often, companies touting a negative
emissions goal are pledging to reduce all or some portion of their
historical emissions. 54
3. Emission Intensity vs. Absolute Emissions
The net zero, zero, and negative emissions reductions discussed
above are generally viewed as "absolute" reductions, meaning that they
constitute a reduction-or potentially an offset, in the case of net zeroof a fixed portion of a company's total emissions.5 5 In contrast, intensity

51. See infra Section I.C.4 for a discussion of carbon capture, carbon removal, and
carbon offsets.
52. See Duncan P. McLaren, David P. Tyfield, Rebecca Willis, Bronislaw Szerszynski & Nils
0. Markusson, Beyond "Net-Zero": A Case for Separate Targets for Emissions Reduction and
Negative Emissions, FRONTIERS CLIMATE (Aug. 21, 2019), https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/
10.3389/fclim.2019.00004/full [https://perma.cc/RP2G-KYXE] ("Yet we see clear evidence that
emissions reductions can be deterred or delayed by efforts and suggestions to use [negative
emissions techniques] to sustain fossil fuel use.").
53. See Nicholas Kusnetz, What Does Net Zero Emissions Mean for Big Oil? Not What You'd
Think, INSIDE CLIMATE NEWS (July 16, 2020), https://insideclimatenews.org/news/16072020/oilgas-climate-pledges-bp-shell-exxon/
[https://perma.cc/8QUW-MFSX]
("[T]he stated net-zero
'ambitions,' as the companies generally call them, do not require that greenhouse gas emissions
fall to zero at all. They rely instead either partly or largely on capturing or canceling out these
emissions with unproven technologies and reforestation at a questionable scale.").
54. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 36 ("[B]y 2050 Microsoft will remove from the environment
all the carbon the company has emitted either directly or by electrical consumption since it was
founded in 1975.").
55.

See TIMOTHY HERZOG, KEVIN A. BAUMERT & JONATHAN PERSHING, WORLD RES. INST.,

TARGET: INTENSITY: AN ANALYSIS OF GREENHOUSE GAS INTENSITY TARGETS 7 (2006),
https://files.wri.org/s3fs-public/pdf/targetintensity.pdf [https://perma.cc/DFM5-GLVP] (defining
absolute targets as "a fixed number of tons of CO2 equivalent, to be achieved at some point in
the future").
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targets define an allowable level of emissions as a function of some
economic indicator. 56 For companies, this indicator may be based on
physical output (e.g., tons of carbon dioxide equivalent ("CO2e") per ton

of steel produced) or a financial metric (e.g., tons of CO2e per dollar of
revenue).5 7 Importantly, because intensity targets are not directly

attached to a fixed reduction in absolute emissions, a company
experiencing a dramatic increase in output could see its total emissions

increase if the decrease in its emission intensity is not enough to offset

58
the total emissions from the growth in output.
Why might a company prefer an intensity target? Proponents

argue that intensity targets, in contrast to absolute reductions, are
more sensitive to changes in economic conditions because they allow
emissions to expand as output expands and contract as output
59
contracts, thus providing more flexibility than absolute reductions.
Further, intensity targets, which effectively decouple economic growth
and emissions growth, are less hostile to economic growth and allow
companies to demonstrate improved emissions performance without
60
compromising growth.

4. Base Years
In contrast to net zero or zero emission targets, many carbon
targets are percentage reductions. But percentage of what? Percentage-

based ERTs are generally attached to the emissions level of a particular
year, which essentially establishes the "pool" of emissions that will be
reduced. 61 The exact base year selected can have a significant impact
on the reduction potential of a pledge depending on how a company's

56. Id. at 3.
57. Id.
58. As an example, consider a cement manufacturer whose emissions intensity in a one-year
period dropped from 250 kg CO2e per ton of cement to 220 kg CO2e per ton. If the company's output
remained at a constant 1 million tons, then the company's absolute emissions would decrease from
250 million kg CO2e to 220 million kg CO2e. But if the company's production increased from 1
million tons to 2 million tons during that year, its absolute emissions would actually increase from
250 million kg CO2e to 440 million kg CO2e.
59. See, e.g., HERZOG ET AL., supra note 55, at 8 ("Intensity targets may reduce the economic
uncertainty associated with particular targets by adjusting to economic changes; that is, they allow
faster-growing economies (or firms) more emissions and contracting ones fewer emissions."); GHG
Emissions Intensity Target Principles, CONOCOPHILLIPS, https://www.conocophillips.com/
(last visited
sustainabihty/managing-climate-related-risks/metrics-targets/ghg-target-principles/
Mar. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8CFF-62S7] ("We are in a dynamic business environment where
plans, technology, prices, industry structure and costs all change rapidly.... An intensity
target that allows a company to change its plans without having to reset its target appears to be
more durable.").
60. HERZOG ETAL., supranote 55, at 8, 10.
61.

WORLD BUs. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & WORLD RES. INST., supra note 40, at 35.
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emission levels have changed over time. For example, in the national

emissions context, a nation whose emissions have risen consistently
may select a later base year to make the total amount of emissions
reduced appear larger.6 2 The same logic applies to the corporate context
as sectors seeing consistent emissions growth may opt for a later base
year in order to be able to tout greater absolute reductions to the public.
C. Implementation
Thus far, the previous sections have made the case that
companies are feeling pressure to address their GHG emissions and
responding, in part, with ERTs that clearly communicate the level of
emissions reduction that can be expected over time. This Section

connects those ambitions to what companies are actually doing to meet
their reduction goals. And what companies are doing goes well beyond
token efforts. Bolstering the argument that ERTs are core
organizational decisions is the public disclosure of concrete plans and
steps to achieve emissions reductions: creating "climate fluent" boards,
tying progress towards and achievement of ERTs to executive
compensation, implementing internal carbon pricing, engaging in
renewable power purchase agreements, and heavily investing in
programs to offset carbon emissions. Although a discussion of the
efficacy of these programs is outside the scope of this Note, it is difficult
not to conclude that companies are dedicating substantial monetary
and time investments into programs to meet their emissions targets.
1. Board Composition and Executive Compensation
At the management level, companies are reshaping boards of
directors-through the appointment of individual directors and the

creation of special committees on sustainability-to increase their
"climate fluency" as well as linking aspects of executive compensation
to fulfillment of climate-related commitments. On board composition,
companies are actively seeking out directors with climate-related
expertise. ExxonMobil added climate scientist Susan Avery to its board
in 2017,63 while ConocoPhillips added environmental law professor and

62. See Sam S. Rowan, Pitfalls in ComparingParisPledges, 155 CLIMATIC CHANGE 455, 459
(2019) ("Governments may choose base years strategically to make an emissions reduction seem
larger .... ").
63. See Randy Showstack, ExxonMobil Adds ClimateExpert to Its Board, EoS (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://eos.org/articles/exxonmobil-adds-climate-expert-to-its-board
[https://perma.cc/R8HF6Z4H] ("Atmospheric scientist Susan Avery has been elected to the board of directors of the
ExxonMobil Corporation.").
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former Obama White House official Jody Freeman to its board in 2012.64
Some companies are electing to create board committees focused on
proposing and implementing climate-related programs as well as
65
communicating those matters to the larger board. Shell has instituted
a Safety, Environment, and Sustainability committee with authority
over "progress toward meeting [Shell's] ambitions regarding its Net
Carbon Footprint, Climate Change and the Energy Transition
underway" as well as the responsibility to "[a]dvise the Remuneration
Committee on metrics relating to Sustainable Development and Energy
Transition." 66

This push for board-level "climate fluency" has the support of

6
67
major asset managers, including BlackRock and State Street, and
69
By actively (and publicly) placing
pension funds like CalPERS.
and installing climate-centric
board
the
on
climate-fluent directors
committees, companies are showcasing a commitment to climate action
at the highest levels of corporate decisionmaking. Moreover, dedicating
specific committees to sustainability and climate change is not too

64. Press Release, ConocoPhillips, ConocoPhillips Announces Election of Ms. Jody Freeman
to Its Board of Directors (July 10, 2012), https://www.conocophillips.com/news-media/story/
[https://perma.cc/
conocophillips-announces-election-of-ms-jody-freeman-to-its-board-of-directors/
7UL2-U82G] ("The board of directors of ConocoPhillips ... has elected Ms. Jody Freeman as a new
outside director.").
65. See, e.g., Lynn S. Paine, Sustainability in the Boardroom, HARV. BUS. REV. (2014),
https://hbr.org/2014/07/sustainability-in-the-boardroom [https://perma.cc/VQ23-3TL7] (explaining
Nike has created a committee to set and maintain corporate responsibility and sustainability
standards that "engages directly with key executives").
66. Safety, Env't & Sustainability Comm., Royal Dutch Shell PLC, Terms of Reference,
SHELL, https://www.shell.com/investors/environmental-social-and-governance/board-of-directors/
9 93
0.stream/160804
_jcr_content/par/grid_copy/p0/expandablelist_copy/expandablesection_73078
dcff76/safety-environment-and-sustainability9078922/c13de3b6ae4c61424ce64b6e87eebd1421
committee-terms-of-reference.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2021) [https://perma.cc/9STC-QBZV].
67. See BlackRock Investment Stewardship: Proxy Voting Guidelines for U.S. Securities,
BLACKROCK 4 (2021), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/literature/fact-sheet/blk-responsibleinvestment-guidelines-us.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS5S-SPHC] ("We will consider voting against
committee members and/or individual directors . . . [w]here the board has failed to exercise
sufficient oversight with regard to material [Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance]
risk factors .... ").
68. See Climate Change Risk Oversight Framework for Directors, STATE ST. GLOB. ADVISORS
(last
https://www.ssga.com/library-content/products/esg/climate-change-risk-oversight.pdf
4,
visited Mar. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/UB6P-MK4B] ("Companies in high-risk sectors should
assess board composition and director expertise in relation to climate competence of the board;
establish mechanisms such as access to climate experts to help educate directors on evolving
climate-related risks.").
69. See Veena Ramani, CalPERS Raises Baron CorporateDirectors'Rolein Tackling Climate
Change, CERES (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.ceres.org/news-center/blog/calpers-raises-bar("CalPERS'
[https://perma.cc/L6BT-4YYT]
corporate-directors-role-tackling-cdimate-change
revised Governance Principles call on companies to make climate change the responsibility of a
board committee or the whole board. Creating such explicit oversight will help ensure that climate
change is considered more systematically by boards.").
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dissimilar from the special committees installed in the context
of mergers and acquisitions, the gold standard of fundamental
corporate events.

On executive compensation, a wide array of companies-

including Microsoft, 70 Walmart, 71 and PepsiCo 72-have
explicitly
included sustainability performance in short-term and long-term
incentive plans. These efforts have backing from some insurance

industry players7 3 and some shareholder groups. 74 The effectiveness of
using executive compensation as a vehicle for improved climate
performance is backed by research, particularly because climate
performance can be more easily quantifiable and tracked as compared
to other sustainability or nonfinancial executive compensation
components. 75 But there is also concern that executives motivated solely
by meeting the targets in their compensation plan will rarely strive to

70. Microsoft Corp., 2019 Proxy Statement 31-32 (Oct. 16, 2019) (discussing the inclusion of
"corporate social responsibility" as a determinant of executives' compensation).
71. Walmart Inc., 2020 Proxy Statement 51 (Apr. 23, 2020) (discussing the role of
environmental, corporate, and social Governance ("ESG") criteria in pay determination).
72. PepsiCo,
Inc.,
2020
Proxy
Statement
44
(Mar.
20,
2020)
(grouping
sustainability performance in a distinct "people and planet" category under a key determinant
of executive compensation).
73. See Shai Ganu & Philipp Geiler, Combating Climate Change Through Executive
Compensation,WILLIS TOWERS WATSON (Sept. 30, 2020), https://www.willistowerswatson.com/enUS/Insights/ 2 0 2 0/09/Combating-climate-change-through-executive-compensation
[https://perma.cc/P854-4PEN] ("More and more companies are beginning to incorporate ESG
measures within their short- and long-term incentive plans for senior executives; but there is still
room for improvement.").
74. See Sustainability Matters: The Rise of ESG Metrics in Executive Compensation,
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP 2 (Mar. 10, 2020), https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SCPublication-Sustainability-Matters-The-Rise-of-ESG-Metrics-in-Executive-Compensation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KWK4-N535) ("A study of 2019 proxy filings ... indicated that, of the 52
executive compensation proposals received by S&P Composite 1500 companies, 18 sought to link
executive pay to ESG metrics, representing a 50% increase to the number of such proposals
received in 2017 and slight decline against 2018 figures."); BP to Support Investor Group's Call for
Greater Reporting Around Paris Goals, BP 2 (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.bp.com/
content/dam/bp/business- sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/news-and-insights/press-releases/bp-tosupport-investor-groups-call-for-greater-reporting-around-paris-goals.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZXU9
-UFQY] ("BP today also announced that greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reductions have now
been included as a factor in the reward of 36,000 employees across the Group and around the
world, including executive directors."); see also BlackRock Investment Stewardship:Proxy Voting
Guidelines for U.S. Securities, supra note 67, at 11 ("We support incentive plans that foster the
sustainable achievement of results consistent with the company's long-term strategic initiatives.").
75. See Caroline Flammer, Bryan Hong & Dylan Minor, CorporateGovernance and the Rise
of Integrating Corporate Social Responsibility Criteria in Executive Compensation: Effectiveness
and Implications for Firm Outcomes, 40 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1097, 1099 (2019) (finding that
including these benchmarks in executive compensation not only reduces emissions but also
increases firm value); Karen Maas, Do Corporate Social Performance Targets in Executive
Compensation Contribute to Corporate Social Performance?, 148 J. BUS. ETHICS 573, 579 (2018)
(noting that using hard, quantitative targets improves corporate social performance).
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exceed those targets. 76 Regardless of the efficacy, including fulfillment
of climate commitments in compensation plans demonstrates an intent
to make sustainability at least a comparable focal point for a company's

operations alongside more traditional metrics such as revenue and
share price.
2. Internal Carbon Pricing
Internal carbon pricing, a longstanding practice for companies,
attaches a company-created monetary value on GHG emissions, which
is subsequently factored into investment decisions and business
operations. 77 These pricing mechanisms can be implemented for a
variety of reasons, such as incentivizing shifts to low-carbon

alternatives,

preparing

for

future

government-imposed

carbon

restrictions, alleviating shareholder and investor concerns about
financial risks associated with carbon emissions, or showcasing
78
corporate leadership in the climate change arena.
Carbon pricing often takes one of, or a combination of, three
forms: internal carbon fees, shadow pricing, or implicit pricing. Internal

carbon fees attach a monetary value to each ton of carbon or GHG
emissions, the revenues from which are used to fund emissions
reduction efforts. 79 Shadow pricing adds a surcharge to market prices
for goods and services that involve significant carbon emissions,
ensuring that investments, procurements, and acquisitions reflect the
80
true cost of carbon emissions. Implicit pricing involves a retroactive
calculation of the amount that a company spends on carbon emissions
abetment or compliance with government emissions regulations; these
costs are highlighted in order to determine where it is cost effective to
81
mitigate carbon emissions at the outset.
Oil majors and other carbon-intensive sectors were early
adopters of internal carbon pricing. Documents from the state of New
York's lawsuit against ExxonMobil indicate that since 2007, the

&

76. See Radhakrishnan Gopalan, John Horn & Todd Milbourn, Comp Targets That Work:
How to Keep Executives from Gaming the System, HARV. Bus. REV. (2017),
https:/Ihbr.org/2017/09/comp-targets-that-work [https://perma.cc/S8AL-3EBG] ("At companies
where payout rates tapered off beyond a given target, CEOs tended to deliver results at or just
above the target and seldom much beyond it.").
77. See Manjyot Bhan Ahluwalia, The Business of Pricing Carbon: How Companies Are
Pricing Carbon to Mitigate Risks and Prepare for a Low-Carbon Future, CTR. FOR CLIMATE
ENERGY SOLS. 1, 5 (2017), https://www.c2es.org/site/assets/uploads/2017/09business-pricngcarbon.pdf [https://perma.cc/FZ3M-DFPN] (discussing the practice of internal carbon pricing).
78. Id. at 5-8.
79. Id. at 3-4.
80. Id. at 4.
81. Id.
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company has been using internal proxy costs of carbon to mimic
potential governmental regulation on carbon emissions, with the cost

estimated to reach $60 per ton of emissions by 2030 for developed
economies. 82 Similarly, BP adopted an internal emissions trading
system in 1999, whereby internal business units would trade emissions

allowances among each other. 83 But internal carbon pricing is not
limited to the oil and gas sector, as demonstrated by Microsoft's decision
to apply its own internal carbon price to all three scopes of emissions. 84
According to CDP, in 2017, almost 1,400 companies were utilizing
internal carbon pricing when formulating business plans.85
3. Renewable Energy Procurement

As discussed above, a company's scope 2 emissions consist of
GHG emissions associated with that company's purchased generated
electricity. 86 Thus, any company including scope 2 emissions in its ERTs
will inevitably look to how it procures its electricity. In particular, this
means replacing carbon-intensive electricity generation (e.g., coal,
natural gas) with renewable energies (e.g., solar, wind). This explains,
at least in part, why companies are committing to dedicating all or some
portion of their electricity procurement to renewable energy. These
companies include Apple, Facebook, Coca-Cola, Nike, and AnheuserBusch/Budweiser. 8 7 In fact, as of publication, over 300 companies have
82. See Benjamin Hulac, This Is How an Oil Giant Uses Internal Carbon Pricing, E&E NEWS
(June 15, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060056076 [https://perma.cc/W8P4-9ETB] ("In
court filings, the company said Friday it forecasts carbon prices that will reach $60 per ton of
emissions by 2030 for wealthy countries and, in some nations, $80 per ton by 2040.").
83. See Sarah E. Light, The New Insider Trading: Environmental Markets Within the Firm,
34 STAN. ENV'T L.J. 3, 30-41 (2015) (explaining BP's internal trading market).
84. See Smith, supra note 36 (noting that Microsoft will begin applying its $15/metric ton
internal carbon tax to its scope 3 emissions).
85. More Than Eight-Fold Leap over Four Years in Global Companies Pricing Carbon into
Business Plans, CDP (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.cdp.net/en/articles/media/more-than-eight-foldleap-over-four-years-in-global-companies-pricing-carbon-into-business-plans
[https://perma.cc/D5GF-AZVH.
86. See WORLD BUS. COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV. & WORLD RES. INST., supranote 40, at
25 ("Scope 2 accounts for GHG emissions from the generation of purchased electricity consumed
by the company." (footnote omitted)).
87. See Press Release, Apple, Apple Now Globally Powered by 100 Percent Renewable Energy
(Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2018/04/apple-now-globally-powered-by-100percent-renewable-energy/ [https://perma.cc/M4DS-HCCC] ("As part of its commitment to combat
climate change and create a healthier environment, Apple today announced its global facilities are
powered with 100 percent clean energy."); Rob Price, Facebook Says It Will Be Powered by 100%
Renewable Energy by 2020, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 28, 2018, 12:00 PM), https://www.businessinsider
.com/facebook-sets-2020-renewable-energy-and-greenhouse-gas-targets-2018-8?r=UK&IR=T
[https://perma.cc/ZX6J-WQ5M] ("On Tuesday, the Silicon Valley tech giant announced that it has
set itself a target of powering its operations with 100% renewable energy 'by the end of 2020.'");
David Ferris, Budweiser Parent Sets Crazy-Ambitious Renewables Goal, E&E NEWS: ENERGYWIRE
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pledged to achieve 100% renewable energy as part of RE100, an
88
These
initiative launched in 2014 by CDP and Climate Group.

electricity demands are not minor costs for many of these companies.
For example, the electricity demand of individual data centers-which
are often owned and/or operated by information companies like Amazon
and Facebook-can exceed the consumption of the towns where they
reside, while the collective demand of all data centers can dwarf the
89
energy consumption of some countries.

4. Carbon Offsets, Capture, and Removal
Many of the climate strategies discussed thus far have focused
on mitigating emissions at the outset: incentivizing executives and
directors to limit emissions through compensation packages, pricing
emissions into projects prior to approval, or procuring renewable energy
as opposed to carbon-intensive energy. Yet companies employing net
emissions targets have other options to meet their goals: carbon
offsetting, carbon removal, and carbon capture. Carbon offset schemes
allow companies to reduce future emissions by investing in
environmental projects that balance out the emissions the company
or
contributes. 90 These projects might include reforestation
the
or
air
the
from
directly
afforestation projects to absorb carbon
purchasing and "tearing up" of emissions credits from an emission
trading scheme, thus limiting the total amount of emissions the
91
scheme allows.
Similarly, carbon removal technologies, or negative emissions
technologies, remove existing atmospheric carbon and store it in the
earth or oceans, effectively mimicking the natural removal performed
by oceans and forests. 92 This process is related to, but distinct from,
5
6
(Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060052308_[https://perma.cc/C6 Z-PE V]
made
brewer,
largest
world's
the
("Anheuser-Busch InBev, the parent company of Budweiser and
a startling announcement this week. It committed to switching its electricity supply to entirely
renewable sources within a scant nine years, and to do so with unusual rigor."). See generally
RE100 Members, RE100, https://www.therel00.org/re100-members (last visited Mar. 16,
(listing companies that have committed to 100%
2021) [https://perma.cc/E35Z-C9AG]

renewable procurement).

88. See RE100 Members, supra note 87.
Up the World's Electricity,
89. See Nicola Jones, How to Stop Data Centres from Gobbling
66 1
6
0-y [https://perma.cc/
NATURE (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.nature.com/articles/d458 -018-0
L8EY-VP7J] ("Already, data centres use an estimated 200 terawatt hours (TWh) each year. That
is more than the national energy consumption of some countries .... ").
Offsetting, GUARDIAN (Sept. 16, 2011,
90. See Duncan Clark, A Complete Guide to Carbon
2
6:13 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/ 011/sep/16/carbon-offset-projects-carbonemissions [https://perma.cc/WTC7-5TXX].
91. Id.
92. Albert C. Lin, Carbon Dioxide Removal After Paris, 45 ECOLOGY L.Q. 533, 536 (2019).
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carbon capture and storage ("CCS"), where carbon from a company's
industrial and energy-related sources is captured before reaching the

atmosphere and then stored in isolation from the atmosphere. 93 In both
instances, emissions are captured on the back end, rather than
mitigated at the outset. Carbon removal and CCS have become focal
points for carbon-intensive industries. For example, Occidental
Petroleum has invested heavily in carbon removal, including
constructing one of the largest plants to capture atmospheric carbon
dioxide, 94 and CCS is highlighted as one of the company's primary
mechanisms to achieve net zero for its scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions before
2050.95 In fact, the company's CEO has stated that she envisions
Occidental becoming a "carbon management company" down the road.9 6

Similarly, Chevron has invested $1 billion in CCS projects in Australia
and Canada and has highlighted investment in CCS as an "energy
transition focus area." 97 Even the Department of Energy has dedicated
ample funding toward CCS research and development. 98 The sheer
amount of investment and the public press indicate that CCS will likely
become a core business activity for carbon-intensive industries like oil
and gas, an activity directly linked to their ERTs.
D. Nonfulfillment
Ambition can, at times, exceed execution, and ERTs are no
different. While quantifying a company's emissions is a relatively
straightforward endeavor, abating or offsetting enough emissions to
meet a particular target can be tricky in spite of all the implementation
measures discussed above. This Section walks through some potential

93. See id. at 562 (explaining how CCS works in relation to carbon removal).
94. Christa Marshall, World's Largest Trap for Airborne CO 2 Planned for West Texas,
ENERGYWIRE (May 22, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1060375171 [https://
perma.cc/6FFX-CQ78].
95.

See

OCCIDENTAL,

CLIMATE

REPORT

2020:

PATHWAY

TO

NET-ZERO

7-8

(2020),

https://www.oxy.com/Sustainability/overview/Documents/ClimateReport2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q5PM-5VKF ('"The focal point of our long-term net-zero strategy is Oxy Low
Carbon Ventures (OLCV) . ... OLCV principally focuses on developing CCUS [carbon capture,
utilization, and storage ("CCUS")] technologies to remove human-made CO 2 from the atmosphere
for use in manufacturing low-carbon products .... ").
96. Mike Lee, Oil Major to Become 'Carbon Management Company,' ENERGYWIRE (Dec. 4,
2020), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/stories/1063719891/search?keyword=oil+major [https
://perma.cc/LA9V-XAHZ].
97. CHEVRON, 2019 CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY REPORT 1, 10 (2020), https://www.chevron
.com/-/media/shared-media/documents/2019-corporate-sustainability-report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4V3D-RRSB].
98. See U.S. Department of Energy Announces $131 Million for CCUS Technologies, U.S.
DEP'T ENERGY (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.energy.gov/articles/us-department-energy-announces131-million-ccus-technologies [https://perma.cc/QK25-JABM].
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pitfalls with ERTs: Growing companies may find it difficult to combat
rising emissions. Renewable energy generation may not be readily

available or may not guarantee sufficient emissions reductions. Carbon
removal or carbon offsets may not provide the necessary offsetting
potential due to technological or scalability limitations.
But what is the harm if a company underperforms its emissions
targets, especially since such targets are entirely voluntary to begin
with? To answer that question, this Section will discuss how unmet
ERTs can still allow companies to reap the benefits of appearing
sustainable, despite a contrary track record, to the detriment of share

price accuracy and market efficiency.
1. The Risk of Nonfulfillment
As with any forward-looking pledge, there is the obvious risk
that companies will simply not be able to meet their climate
commitments on time. This is not an unfounded hypothetical. One
analysis of eighty-one companies with ERTs approved by the SBTi
found that 49% were falling behind the necessary target trajectory for
99
at least one element of their SBTi portfolio. While it is difficult-if not
impossible-to accurately compare ERTs with different reduction
targets, deadlines, baselines, and scopes of emissions, the study found
that the risk of falling behind was greater for mid- and long-term
targets, for targets that included scope 3 emissions, and for companies
that were not already achieving reductions prior to having their ERT
0
approved by the SBTi. 10 Similarly, a Bloomberg analysis of 187 climate
pledges with a deadline of 2020 or earlier determined that thirty-twoor about 17%-were not fulfilled or not presently on track to reach
fulfillment, 101 while a 2016 Bain & Company survey of three hundred
companies that engaged in sustainability programs found that only 2%
of respondents met or achieved their sustainability targets, 81%
99. Jannik Giesekam, Jonathan Norman, Alice Garvey & Sam Betts-Davies, Science-Based
10,
at
2021,
4,
Feb.
4,
no.
13,
Target?, SUSTAINABILITY
Targets: On
3 4 6
https://doi.org/10.3390/sul O l 57 [https://perma.cc/Y4ZE-66MR].
100. Id. at 9-13.
101. See Todd Gillespie, Hayley Warren & Tom Randall, Time's Up on Corporate America's
2020 Climate Goals. Here's the Results, BLOOMBERG: BLOOMBERG GREEN (Dec. 14, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/2WY4https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-company-emissions-pledges/
8567]. For ERTs with a 2020 deadline, note that the economic downturn resulting from the COVID19 pandemic has resulted in a dip in worldwide carbon emissions, indicating that recent declines
in emissions may be temporary. Id.; see also Zhu Liu et al., Near-Real-Time Monitoring of Global
C02 Emissions Reveals the Effects of the COVID-19 Pandemic, 11 NATURE COMMC'NS, Oct. 14,
2020, at 2, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-020-18922-7 [https://perma.cc/QPT7-F7JU] (noting that
C02 emissions from January 1, 2020 to June 30, 2020 decreased by 8.8% as compared to the same
period in 2019, "larger than for any recent economic downturn, and larger than the annual
decrease .. . during World War II").
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settled for a diluted goal, and 16% failed to produce even half of their
expected results.1 0 2
Looking to specific examples, Kraft Heinz announced in
September 2020 that it would not meet the 2020 GHG reduction goals
it set in 2017, citing difficulties in limiting emissions in its supply

chain.10 3 Further, some companies have experienced emissions
performance in the opposite direction. Levi Strauss, which set forth a

goal in 2018 to reduce its scope 3 emissions by 40% by 2025,104 saw the
emissions from its supply chain increase by 13% between 2016 and

2019.105 Amazon, which has established a pledge to achieve net zero
carbon by 2040,106 observed a 15% increase in its overall carbon
emissions from 2018 to 2019, despite noting reductions in its
carbon intensity. 107 While both Levi Strauss and Amazon still have
time to meet their commitments, every annual increase in carbon
emissions makes it that much harder to achieve the necessary

reductions or offsets.

&

Pointing out nonfulfillment is not meant to shame those
companies who fail to attain their ambitious and necessary climate
goals. Rather, it is meant to highlight the inherent difficulty in
achieving any ambitious GHG emissions goal. 108 That same Bain
Company survey found that managers and employees cited lack of
investment and competing priorities as the primary barriers to

102. See Jenny Davis-Peccoud, Paul Stone & Clare Tovey, Achieving BreakthroughResults in
Sustainability, BAIN & CO. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.bain.com/insights/achievingbreakthrough-results-in-sustainability [https://perma.cc/5EMS-V7C8].
103. See Nic Querolo, Kraft Heinz Says It Will Fall Short of 2020 Environmental Goals, FIN.
POST (Sept. 16, 2020), https://financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/kraft-heinz-says-it-will-fallshort-of-2020-environmental-goals [https://perma.cc/BX6Z-MFKW].
104. See LEVI STRAUSS & CO., CLIMATE ACTION STRATEGY 2025, at 2 (2018),
https://www.levistrauss.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/LSCOClimate ActionStrategy
2025.pdf [https://perma.cc/R2T9-N8WB].
105. See Peter Eavis & Clifford Krauss, What's Really Behind Corporate Promiseson Climate
Change?, N.Y. TIMES (Feb, 24, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/02/22/business/energyenvironment/corporations-climate-change.html?smid=url-share [https://perma.cc/A38P-Q5UA].
106. See AMAZON, REACHING NET ZERO CARBON BY 2040: MEASURING, MAPPING, AND
REDUCING CARBON THE AMAZONIAN WAY 2 (2019), https://d39w7f4ix9f5s9.cloudfront.net/

a4/ad/b9eca67e4578b35e8f995c8b4f9c/amazon-carbon-methodology-september-2019.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6UGR-5NF5].
107. See Carbon Footprint, AMAZON, https://sustainability.aboutamazon.com/environment/
sustainable-operations/carbon-footprint (last visited Mar. 16, 2021) [https://perma.cc/T9VUFAD4].
108. To reinforce this point, national governments-including major emitters like the United
States, China, and even the typically "ahead of the curve" European Union-are similarly
struggling to meet their climate pledges under the Paris Agreement. See Brad Plumer & Nadja
Popovich, The World Still Isn't Meeting Its Climate Goals, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2018),
https://nyti.ms/2wl3wyG [https://perma.cc/4UTB-9T8Z].

1160

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:4:1137

109
Further, many of the measures being
achievement of climate pledges.

employed to reduce or offset emissions may not provide the necessary
reduction or offsetting potential, or they have proven difficult to invent,
implement, and scale up.
Even the particular implementation measures used by many
companies present concerns over nonfulfillment. Renewable energy
pledges present not so much a problem of execution but rather of

accounting. When a company purchases renewable energy, it often does
so through a power purchase agreement with a renewable energy
developer, whereby the developer sends renewable energy to the grid
used by the company while the company receives renewable energy
credits that can be used to offset emissions from its power
consumption.1 1 0 But if the company's operations are connected to the
electric grid, it is drawing energy from the energy generators connected

to that grid, no matter if it is a wind farm or a coal-fired power plant.
Thus, depending on the nature of the power purchase agreement and
the mix of the local grid, the company may not be getting all of its energy
from renewable sources.
For carbon removal and carbon offsetting, there are growing
concerns about the disconnect between theoretical removal potential
and actual removal capability, especially when factoring in cost. Given
the lower concentration of carbon in the ambient air-a small fraction
of the concentration found in smokestacks-direct air capture can be
extremely costly."1 Additionally, the market for carbon dioxide is
currently limited, which will make it difficult to provide enough revenue
1 12
Concerns about
to offset the potentially enormous costs of capture.
limited capture potential and prohibitive cost may render carbon
removal either too inefficient to meet an ERT or too costly to be scalable.
Thus, it is not a given that the pronouncement of an ERT means
achievement of that ERT. If nonfulfillment occurs, absent a mea culpa
to that effect, like in the Kraft Heinz example, there becomes a
disconnect between market expectations and reality. As discussed

109. David-Peccoud et al., supra note 102, at 3.
110. See Benjamin Storrow, 100 PercentRenewable Pledges Do Not Equal Carbon-FreePower,
SCI. AM. (May 28, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/100-percent-renewablepledges-do-not-equal-carbon-free-power/ [https://perma.cc/M6VU-VBYJ].
111. See Lin, supra note 92, at 540 ('"The estimated cost of removing carbon via [direct air
capture] exceeds $250 per ton of CO 2 and could remain prohibitively expensive.").
112. See Katie Lebling, Noah McQueen, Max Pisciotta & Jennifer Wilcox, Direct Air Capture:
Resource Considerations and Cost for Carbon Removal, WORLD RES. INST. (Jan. 6, 2021),
https://www.wri.org/blog/2021/01/direct-air-capture-definition-cost-considerations
[https://perma.cc/244R-KHBH] (noting that markets for C02 are "limited and cannot provide
enough revenue to offset the cost of capture" and discussing enhanced oil recovery ("EOR"),
currently the largest C02 market).
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further, this disconnect can have implications for stock prices, market
efficiency, and investor protection.

2. The Potential Market Effects of Nonfulfillment
The fundamental purpose of financial markets is the efficient

allocation of capital, or allocative efficiency.1 1 3 Such allocative efficiency
is achieved, at least in part, when markets efficiently exchange
information and insights about a security. 114 As this information is
exchanged and processed, security prices adjust according to how the
market perceives the effect of such information-rising with good news
and falling with bad news. 115 Thus, security prices can be viewed as the
language by which markets communicate. 116
Market efficiency begins to break down when the information
being exchanged cannot be viewed as reliable or accurate.1 17 While
113. See, e.g., Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities
Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 713 (2006) ("[T]he ultimate goal of securities regulation is to attain
efficient financial markets and thereby improve the allocation of resources in the economy.");
Charles K. Whitehead, Reframing FinancialRegulation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1, 35 (2010) ("The basic
goals of the markets have remained the same-namely, the efficient allocation, transfer, and
deployment of capital resources and risk-bearing."); Steve Thel, Regulation of ManipulationUnder
Section 10(b): Security Prices and the Text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 COLUM.
BUs. L. REV. 359, 372 ("It is often said that the most important thing about securities markets is
their influence in moving money from savers to users."). But see Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance
of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock Market Pricingand Securities Regulation, 87
MICH. L. REV. 613 (1988) (challenging the conclusion that efficiency should be the sole concern of
securities regulation).
114. See Yesha Yadav, How Algorithmic Trading Undermines Efficiency in Capital Markets,
68 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1631 (2015) (noting trader "interactions reveal what they know about a
security and how much they wish to pay to buy or sell it based on their knowledge and risk
preferences" and that such exchanges "reflect[] the information and insights of traders in the
prices at which securities trade"); see also Thel, supra note 113, at 399 (noting that, alongside
straightforward disclosure, "[t]he act of trading communicates important information").
115. This relationship between information and security price is also known as the Efficient
Capital Markets Hypothesis ("ECMH"), which posits that security prices reflect all available
information. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (the seminal article on the ECMH). A version of the ECMH that
assumes security prices efficiently adjust to incorporate all publicly available information-also
known as "semi-strong" ECMH-has become a fundamental part of securities litigation. See Basic
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-48 (1988) (relying on the semi-strong ECMH to rule that
securities fraud plaintiffs may invoke a rebuttable presumption of reliance on the integrity of the
security's price); Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 283-84 (2014) (ruling
that a defendant can rebut a presumption of reliance in securities fraud by proving that the alleged
misrepresentation did not affect the price).
116. See Yadav, supranote 114, at 1631 ("According to established economic theory, markets
speak through prices.").
117. The decline in public and investor confidence in the accuracy of security prices was a key
concern for those crafting federal securities law in the 1930s. See, e.g., Joel Seligman, The
Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 51-53 (1983)
(describing Roosevelt's desire for law requiring more public disclosure). Section 2 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 highlights how restoring investor confidence was a primary driver in its
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share prices reflect publicly disseminated information, this public
information includes both accurate information and inaccurate yet
unrefuted information. 118 An increase in the latter causes the share
19
price to deviate further from the fundamental value of the company.1
In other words, the accuracy of the share price diminishes. Further,
20
threats to price accuracy reduce market liquidity.1 As traders realize
that a share price is inaccurate, some may withdraw from the market
for that security, thus limiting the pool of traders and thereby reducing
the overall liquidity of that asset.121 Those who remain will be forced to
factor this increased illiquidity into share prices, thus causing price
22
accuracy to deviate further from fundamental value.1

These effects are no less real for "nonfinancial information," such
as climate information like ERTs. One study, using traditional event
study methodology, found that the announcement of corporate
sustainability initiatives leads to statistically significant increases in
stock returns.1 23 A similar study found a positive relationship between
24
stock price and the announcement of environmental awards.1 These
studies indicate that investors factor in the dissemination of climate
information alongside traditionally financial information, which lends
credence to the notion that inaccurate climate information may lead to

market inefficiencies.
Misled investors present another concern. For this, it is helpful
to view this risk to market efficiency from the perspective of a commonly
Through
greenwashing.
concern:
environmental
understood
an
portray
effectively,
yet
greenwashing, a company is able to "falsely,

passage. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 2, 48 Stat. 881, 882 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78b) (justifying the legislation as necessary to "insure the maintenance
of fair and honest markets").
118. See Thel, supra note 113, at 398 ("Prices may change in response to false or
misleading communications since security prices reflect what investors believe, even if those
beliefs are wrong.").
119. See Goshen & Parchomovsky, supra note 113, at 730 ("The larger the deviation between
price and value and the longer it takes for prices to revert to value, the less efficient the
market is.").
120. See Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, DeterringAlgorithmic Manipulation, 74 VAND. L. REV. 259,
279-80 (2021) (discussing the effects of market manipulation on market liquidity).
121. Id.
122. Id.; Thel, supra note 113, at 373 ("Investors will demand a premium for participating in
volatile markets or in markets in which they believe that others are better able to predict future
prices." (footnote omitted)).
123. See Caroline Flammer, Corporate Social Responsibility and ShareholderReaction: The
Environmental Awareness of Investors, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 758, 771 (2013) (finding that
"shareholders react positively to the announcement of eco-friendly initiatives").
124. See Robert D. Klassen & Curtis P. McLaughlin, The Impact of Environmental
Management on Firm Performance, 42 MGMT. SCI. 1199, 1212-13 (1996).
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image of environmental responsibility to obtain undeserved benefits." 125

As one commenter notes, corporations can achieve greenwashing
through posturing, which focuses on "convinc[ing] internal customers,

as much as external stakeholders, of the organization's collective
commitment to ethics." 126 Posturing can be effective because a
corporation is likely undertaking voluntary climate action in order to

increase sales, obtain or retain investment, and cultivate a sustainable
reputation among its peers-as discussed in Section I.A.
Absent a public update on progress, an unfulfilled ERT that
lingers in the market is a clear example of posturing. The company is
able to reap the benefit of "meeting" an ERT-whether through
reputational benefits, investment from institutional investors with
longer investment horizons, or some other benefit-without having

actually achieved the necessary emissions reduction. Moreover, since
the company is likely using ERTs to obtain buy-in or business from
stakeholders-such as customers, clients, or investors-who value
sustainability, 127 failing to meet those ERTs may cause investors to
invest in and support practices they find unethical. 128
Given confluence of these market concerns-market inefficiency,
inaccurate share prices, and misled investors-it may be worth
exploring options under existing U.S. securities law to mitigate those ill
effects. The next Part explores one such option: the duty to update.
II. U.S. SECURITIES LAW AND THE DUTY TO UPDATE
Federal securities law operates under the guiding
"investors must have access to accurate information
making investment and voting decisions in order for
markets to function effectively." 12 9 To implement this

principle that
important to
the financial
mandate, the

125. Bryant Cannon, Note, A Plea for Efficiency: The Voluntary EnvironmentalObligationsof
InternationalCorporationsand the Benefits of Information Standardization, 19 N.Y.U. ENV'T L.J.
454, 478 (2012).
126. See William S. Laufer, Social Accountability and Corporate Greenwashing, 43 J. BUS.
ETHICS 253, 256-57 (2003).
127. See Flammer, supra note 123, at 760 (noting that CEOs have cited "brand, trust, and
reputation ... as one of the main factors driving them to take action on sustainability issues"
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
128. See Cadesby B. Cooper, Note, Rule 10b-5 at the Intersection of Greenwash and Green
Investment: The Problem of Economic Loss, 42 B.C. ENV'TAFFS. L. REV. 405, 433 (2015).
129. See, e.g., Business and Financial Disclosure Required by Regulation S-K, Securities Act
Release No. 10,064, Exchange Act Release No. 77,599, 81 Fed. Reg. 23,916, 23,921 (proposed Apr.
22, 2016). The decline in public and investor confidence in the accuracy of securities prices leading
up to and during the Great Depression was a key driver in the 1930s passage of the current federal
securities statutes. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 2, 48 Stat. 881, 882
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78b) (justifying the legislation as necessary to "insure the
maintenance of fair and honest markets'); see also Seligman, supra note 117, at 51-53
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Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), pursuant to its powers
under section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
13 1
to comply with extensive
Act"), 130 requires "reporting companies"
outlined in
requirements,
disclosure
periodic and event-specific
Regulation S-K.132
Even though the SEC has created an expansive mandatory
disclosure regime, voluntary ERTs, by their very nature, exist outside
of this regime, appearing instead in company-issued sustainability
reports and in disclosures to voluntary climate disclosure regimes like
CDP and SASB. In the absence of a mandated disclosure required by
SEC regulation, corporate disclosures are policed by the antifraud
133
and, by extension, Rule
provisions of the Exchange Act section 10(b)
134
Rule 10b-5 makes it
10b-5 and its associated private right of action.
unlawful to "make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made,
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading." 135 This rule applies with equal force to both mandated and

voluntary disclosures. 136

(documenting President Roosevelt's and the SEC's concerns about declining public confidence in
over-the-counter securities trading).
130. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m. This statutory provision requires annual reports to be filed with the
SEC, as well as "such information and documents ... as the [SEC] shall require" in order to keep
the issuer's registration statement "reasonably current." Id. § 78m(a).
131. There are three categories of "reporting companies" that are required to file quarterly and
annual reports under the Exchange Act. The first includes companies whose stocks or bonds are
traded on any national securities exchange, such as NASDAQ or the New York Stock Exchange.
Id. § 781(a). The second includes publicly traded companies with at least $10 million in assets
whose securities are held by at least 2,000 persons or "500 persons who are not accredited
investors," as defined by the SEC. Id. § 781(g). The third and final category includes companies
selling nonexchange traded securities pursuant to an effective registration statement, usually via
a public offering, under the Securities Act of 1933, unless there are fewer than 300 shareholders
of record a year after the offering. Id. § 780(d).
132. Codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2020); see also Adoption of Disclosure Regulation and
Amendments of Disclosure Forms and Rules, Securities Act Release No. 5893, Exchange Act
Release No. 14,306, Investment Company Act Release No. 10,070, 42 Fed. Reg. 65,554 (Dec. 30,
1977) (adopting a set of disclosure regulations collectively termed Regulation S-K).
133. Section 10(b) makes it unlawful "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
or any securities-based swap agreement any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of' SEC rules and regulations promulgated under this section. 15 U.S.C. § 78j.
134. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2020); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
751 (1975) (finding an implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5 for "the holders of puts,
calls, options, and other contractual rights or duties to purchase or sell securities").
135. 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5(b).
136. See, e.g., Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 26 (1st Cir. 1987) (citing SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860-61 (2d Cir. 1968)) ("When a corporation does make a
disclosure-whether it be voluntary or required-there is a duty to make it complete and
accurate."); In re Marsh & Mclennan Cos. Sec. Litig., 501 F. Supp. 2d 452, 469 (S.D.N.Y.
2006) (same).
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This focus on policing fraud and misleading statements
necessarily constrains the universe of statements that fall within the
ambit of Rule 10b-5. In particular, the issuer must have a duty to

disclose the information at issue, 13 7 and the information must be
material to investors. 138 The interplay of these requirements means
that not all material information must be disclosed, while some

immaterial information must be disclosed-usually as part of the SEC's
mandatory disclosure regime rather than by judicial ruling. 1 39 This Part
will take up both duty and materiality, as well as briefly discuss the
cautionary language that often accompanies voluntary statements.
A. DisclosureDuties and the Duty to Update
There is no Rule 1Ob-5 liability simply because an investor would
like to know the information at issue. 140 Rather, there must be a duty
to speak.1 4 1 This requirement is the product of the Supreme Court's
decision in Chiarella v. United States, which stated that "[w]hen an
allegation of fraud is based upon nondisclosure, there can be no fraud
absent a duty to speak" and that "a duty to disclose under [Exchange
Act] § 10(b) does not arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market
information." 14 2 The Court further elaborated that a duty to speak
arises only when one party has information "that the other [party] is
entitled to know because of a fiduciary or similar relation of trust and
confidence between them." 143 While Chiarellacould have been limited
to its facts-an insider-trading case-the Court imported the
requirement to the larger Rule 10b-5 framework in Basic Inc. v.
Levinson, holding that "[s]ilence, absent a duty to disclose, is not
misleading under Rule lOb-5."14 4 Although the Court was clear that a
duty to speak was essential, neither decision provided robust guidance
about when the necessary fiduciary-like relationship existed or about
137. See infra Section II.A.
138. See infra Section II.C.
139. See Donald C. Langevoort & G Mitu Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule
10b-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639, 1644-45 (2004).
140. See ZVI Trading Corp. Emps.' Money Purchase Pension Plan & Tr. v. Ross (In re Time
Warner Inc. Sec. Litig.), 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[A] corporation is not required to disclose
a fact merely because a reasonable investor would very much like to know that fact.").
141. See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44-45 (2011) (holding that there
is no "affirmative duty to disclose any and all material information" and that "[e]ven with respect
to information that a reasonable investor might consider material, companies can control what
they have to disclose . . . by controlling what they say to the market").
142. 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
143. Id. at 228 (alteration in original) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a)
(AM. L. INST. 1977)).
144. 485 U.S. 224, 239 n.17 (1988).
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145 This
the types of duties that might exist under such a relationship.
naturally led to lower courts supplementing the SEC mandatory

146
disclosure regime with implied disclosure duties.
Chiarellaand Basic provide cover for issuers to remain silent if

they so choose, but if an issuer chooses to speak, it must ensure its

147
or "misleading." 14 8 This is akin to the
statements are not "untrue"
half-truth doctrine: once an issuer elects to speak, it must include all
14 9
Omnicare, Inc.
facts necessary to make what is said not misleading.
v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund
effectively affirmed this view when the Court held that liability under
Exchange Act section 11 can exist when the omission of a fact makes an
1 0
opinion misleading to the reasonable investor. 5 While Omnicare dealt
with a section 11 claim, lower courts have imported the ruling to section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 given the similarity in language across the various
provisions. 151 Thus, the "misleading" requirement of Rule 10b-5 has
teeth, even when it comes to the nondisclosure of information rendering
a prior statement misleading.
With this disclosure duty backdrop in mind, there is a particular
genre of affirmative statements that adds a temporal element to the
"misleading" inquiry: forward-looking statements. Forward-looking
statements encapsulate "predictive statements or subjective analyses,
15 2
such as projections, forecasts, plans, opinions, motives, or intentions."
Importantly, such statements "require the passage of time to discern

145. Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 139, at 1641-42; Porter, supra note 17, at 2205-06.
146. Porter, supra note 17, at 2206.
147. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2020) (making it unlawful "[t]o make any
untrue statement").

148. Id. (making it unlawful to "to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading"
(emphasis added)).
149. See, e.g., Hoxworth v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 200 n.19 (3d Cir. 1990)
(reasoning that "misleading half-truths (i.e. failures to disclose sufficient information to render
statements actually made not misleading)" are actionable under Rule l0b-5). For a general
discussion of how the half-truth doctrine interacts with disclosure duties, see Donald C.
Langevoort, Half-Truths: ProtectingMistaken Inferences by Investors and Others, 52 STAN. L. REV.
87 (1999).
150. 575 U.S. 175, 186-89 (2015).
151. See, e.g., Tongue v. Sanofi, 816 F.3d 199, 209-10 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that Omnicare
"refined the standard for analyzing whether a statement of opinion is materially misleading" and
applying Omnicare to the Section 10(b) claims at issue); City of Dearborn Heights Act 345 Police
& Fire Ret. Sys. v. Align Tech., Inc., 856 F.3d 605, 616 (9th Cir. 2017) ("Although Omnicare
concerned Section 11 claims, we conclude that the Supreme Court's reasoning is equally applicable
to Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims."); see also City of Omaha Civilian Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. CBS
Corp., 679 F.3d 64, 67-68 (2d Cir. 2012) ("[Section 10(b) and Section 11] claims all share a material
misstatement or omission element.").
152. Susanna Kim Ripken, Predictions, Projections, and Precautions: Conveying Cautionary
Warnings in CorporateForward-LookingStatements, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 929, 937.
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their truth or falsity." 15 3 Thus, a forward-looking statement that is

accurate at the time of issuance-in other words, not an outright
misrepresentation or lie-may, due to subsequent and intervening
events, become inaccurate or misleading over time.
As this Part will discuss, lower courts have wrestled with
whether this temporal element warrants an implied "duty to update"

forward-looking statements. According to one formulation, a "duty to
update opinions and projections may arise" under Rule 10b-5 "if the
original opinions or projections have become misleading as the result of
intervening events."1 5 4 The necessity of intervening events or the

passage of time means the duty to update does not apply to forwardlooking statements that were inaccurate or misleading when issued.
This temporal requirement separates the duty to update from the
closely related duty to correct, which arises when the statement at issue
was unknowingly false when it was made, warranting a later

correction.1 55 Because the duty to correct requires one be able to assess
the veracity of a statement at its outset, forward-looking statements

generally do not fall within the ambit of the duty to correct.1 5 6
Therefore,
to correct.

the following inquiry omits consideration

of the duty

The duty to update, along with much of the debate over disclosure
duties in general, has created a significant amount of confusion and
consternation.1 57 To some, the duty to update is within the competency
of the courts and is necessary to police forward-looking statements on
which investors are reasonably relying.1 58 To others, an expansive duty
to update risks discouraging forward-looking statements as well as
153. Id. at 938; see also Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 805 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding
that a statement "whose truth or falsity is discernible only after it is made" is a forwardlooking statement).

154. ZVI Trading Corp. Emps.' Money Purchase Pension Plan & Tr. v. Ross (In re Time Warner
Inc. Sec. Litig.), 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993).
155. See Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1331 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
the duty to correct "applies when a company makes a historical statement that, at the time made,
the company believed to be true, but as revealed by subsequently discovered information actually
was not").
156. Id. (reasoning that the duty to correct largely applies to historical facts, not forwardlooking statements).
157. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 139, at 1664 (labeling the duty to update "the most
controversial 'duty' doctrine under Rule 10b-5"); see also Porter, supra note 17, at 2206 ("From
their first mention, no consensus has existed as to what is meant by a ... duty to update.").
158. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 139, at 1678 ("[W]hen a form of issuer disclosure
actually has the potential to mislead investors, courts have long-standing institutional competence
to police the area. And to us, the duty to update - properly understood - has this character.");
Backman v. Polaroid Corp., 910 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1990) ("We may agree that, in special
circumstances, a statement, correct at the time, may have a forward intent and connotation upon
which parties may be expected to rely. If this is a clear meaning, and there is a change, correction,
more exactly, further disclosure, may be called for.").
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creating a continuous disclosure regime that contradicts the SEC's
159
And to still others, the
preference for a periodic disclosure regime.
duty to update is entirely incongruent with federal securities law,
namely Rule 10b-5. 160 Nevertheless, the following Section pulls from the
existing case law to outline the contours of the duty to update.

B. The Contours of the Duty to Update
While the duty to update may appear broad in scope, lower
courts have arrived at several limiting principles to cabin its scope. In
particular, the statement must be "alive" in the minds of investors to
create a reliance interest, must create clear and verifiable
expectations about what is projected to come to fruition, and must
pertain to fundamental changes or long-term strategies that make
reliance reasonable.
1. Alive in the Minds of Investors
For a duty to update to even arise, the statement at issue must
161
More precisely, the statement
be "'alive' in the minds of investors."
must "contain some factual representation that remains 'alive' in the
16 2
As a result, the
minds of investors as a continuing representation."
statements.
historical
to
applied
been
not
generally
has
duty to update
Requiring updates to historical facts, such as financial statements,
whenever circumstances change would theoretically eliminate the
159. See Gallagher v. Abbot Lab'ys, 269 F.3d 806, 810 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming the circuit's
aversion to the duty to update, in part "to maintain the difference between periodic-disclosure and
continuous-disclosure systems"); Jeffrey A. Brill, Note, The Status of the Duty to Update, 7
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 605, 672 (1998) ("The present legislative intent of, and SEC
commitment to, promoting the public policy goals of promoting efficient markets and protecting
investors through the encouragement of forward-looking statements will probably trump the
notion of protection via a broad duty to update." (footnote omitted)); see also Guides for Disclosure
of Projections of Future Economic Performance, 43 Fed. Reg. 53,246, 53,247 (Nov. 15, 1978)
("[T]he availability of forward-looking and analytical information is important to an investor's
assessment of a corporation's future earning power and may be material to informed
investment decisionmaking.").

160. See Stransky, 51 F.3d at 1332 (holding that Rule 10b-5's inclusion of the phrase "in light
of the circumstances under which [the statements] were made" inevitably precludes "basing
liability on circumstances that arise after the speaker makes the statement" (emphasis omitted)
(quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2020)); see also Porter, supra note 17, at 2247 ("Even if a
forward-looking statement becomes misleading over time, the literal language of Rule 10b-5(b)
does not permit the examination of events that occur after a statement is made to determine
whether the statement is misleading.").
161. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1432 (3d Cir. 1997).
162. Kowal v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. (In re Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. Sec. Litig.), 163 F.3d 102,
110 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Backman, 910 F.2d at 17 (reasoning that further disclosure may be
necessary when statements "have a forward intent and connotation upon which parties may be
expected to rely").
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concept of a periodic disclosure regime, which the SEC relies upon; as
one commentator has reasoned, "[a] duty to update historical factual
statements is simply a duty to disclose all material information in
disguise."1 6 3 In Shaw v. Digital Equipment Corp., the defendant

publicly stated that "[s]ervice revenues have continued to grow," a
statement that the First Circuit viewed as a "statement of historical
fact not alleged to be false." 164 The court elaborated that absent some
allegation of falsity, assessments of prior performance "do not
themselves give rise to a duty to inform the market whenever
present circumstances suggest that the future may bring a turn for
the worse." 16 5

Relatedly, courts have been leery to attach a duty to update to
simple financial projections. The Third Circuit has reasoned that
financial projections do not involve an implicit assurance that identified
trends will continue, nor do they require updates if deviations occur. 16 6
Without such implicit assurance, the court determined that no
reasonable investor would expect companies to update "ordinary"
financial projections. 167 This attitude against attaching the duty to
update to financial projections has been adopted by other courts. 168
In contrast to historical facts and ordinary financial projections,

the types of statements where courts have contemplated a duty to
163. Porter, supra note 17, at 2215.
164. 82 F.3d 1194, 1219 n.33 (1st Cir. 1996).
165. Id. at 1202. The First Circuit, in dicta, has suggested that a historical statement with a
"forward intent and connotation" can give rise to reliance concerns and may implicate the duty to
update. See Backrman, 910 F.2d at 17; cf. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1015
(9th Cir. 2018) (noting that while previously disclosed positive clinical drug trial results were
accurate, the reality that subsequent negative clinical trials results would "diminish[ ] the weight"
of the previous positive results raises a duty to disclose when those subsequent results are in
fact negative).
166. See In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1432-33 (concluding that "we do not think
it can be said that an ordinary earnings projection contains an implicit representation on the part
of the company that it will update the investing public with all material information that relates
to that forecast").
167. See id. (holding that, "as a result of the background regulatory structure," the reasonable
investor would not expect companies to update ordinary financial projections). As Professors
Langevoort and Gulati note, In re Burlington Coat Factory's emphasis on whether the statements
at issue contained an implicit assurance to update investors-an "approach [] more based in
contract"-was a deviation from prior precedent that focused on whether the statements had the
potential to mislead investors-a tort-like approach. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 139, at
1666-67. The two further note that the Third Circuit's subsequent decision in Weiner V. Quaker
Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310 (3d Cir. 1997), returned to the tort-like approach used before In re
Burlington Coat Factory. Id. at 1667.
168. See, e.g., In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 536 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing In re
Burlington Coat Factory's conclusion that the duty to update does not apply to ordinary earnings
forecasts); Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1333 (7th Cir. 1995) (suggesting that
"a projection can lead to liability under Rule 10b-5 only if it was not made in good faith or was
made without a reasonable basis").
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update evidence some level of internal control and a defined timeline to
create the implication that such statements will be updated if
circumstances require. 169 In Weiner v. Quaker Oats, Co., the Third
Circuit found that Quaker Oats' repeated statement that it would
adhere to a specified debt-equity ratio could require an update once
Quaker Oats quietly discussed a debt-financed acquisition that would
have materially increased its debt-equity ratio beyond the assured
limit. 170 In this case, adherence to an internal debt-equity ratio was
within control of the company, not at the whim of market forces; in cases
of internal control, there may be a more acute need for disclosure to
investors. In Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., Orexigen had

disclosed positive results from the first benchmark of a standard drug
testing schedule but delayed disclosure of negative results in
171
The Ninth Circuit placed great weight on
subsequent benchmarks.
the company's decision to disclose the initial results in finding that it
was independently and affirmatively "obligated to share" the
subsequent test results, which "diminished" the value of the initial
disclosures. 172 Like the Quaker Oats, Co. example, Orexigen (1) had
control over the results of the drug testing and (2) was engaging in a
clearly defined drug testing schedule, whereby subsequent results
would reasonably be expected to impact the weight of prior disclosures.
In short, it is much more likely that a court will find a forward-looking
statement misleading if it pertains to material internal events known
only to or within the control of the company, rather than mere mistake
173
or incorrect projections.
2. Clear and Verifiable Expectations
Related to the "alive" inquiry, courts have been less comfortable
finding a duty to update when dealing with statements that are, at best,
vague and merely optimistic. Such statements often lack the detail
169. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 139, at 1678 ("There are some disclosures that
reasonably do lead investors to rely on the statements beyond the date on which the statement
was made: that is, those that establish some new policy or speak in terms of a plan or commitment
in a way that invites continued reliance."). Yet other commenters, while acknowledging this
argument, reject it as inconsistent with broader disclosure policy. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 17,
at 2219 & n.117 (raising the argument that forward-looking statements "have been suggested to
contain an implicit representation that they will be updated if circumstances change" but
qualifying that raising the argument "is not to suggest [their] agreement with the argument").
170. 129 F.3d at 317.
171. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 994-97 (9th Cir. 2018).
172. Id. at 1015.
173. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 139, at 1667 (noting that the Second Circuit held
that declining to update previous corporate financial statements, in light of an impending merger,
violated the duty to update).
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necessary to cultivate clearly defined, reasonable, and verifiable
expectations about what the company plans to do. 174 Thus, this factor is
akin to the "puffery" defense, which creates a form of legal immunity

for statements that are vague or hyperbolic. 175 Puffery assumes that a
reasonable investor would ignore such statements as immaterial or as
lacking sufficient substance on which to base investment decisions. 176
Puffery is frequently used to dismiss Rule 10b-5 claims, often by

screening out claims that are simply objections to how subsequent
events panned out or to management's strategic choices, as opposed to
objections related to fraudulent or misleading statements.177 The duty
to update case law uses puffery in a similar fashion, though courts, in
keeping with the focus on investor protection, frame the issue as a

matter of what investors should reasonably expect based on the
statements at issue. 178 Even the Seventh Circuit, which has prolifically
voiced opposition to a general duty to update, muted its opposition with
respect to "statements of intent to take a certain action." 179
For example, in Burlington Coat Factory, the Third Circuit
addressed a duty to update claim concerning optimistic statements that
the company believed it could "continue to grow net earnings at a faster
rate than sales" and that one of its officers was "comfortable" with an

analyst's earnings-per-share projection. 180 The court rejected the claim,
finding "[c]laims that these kinds of vague expressions of hope by
corporate managers could dupe the market have been almost uniformly

174. Kowal v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. (In re Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. Sec. Litig.), 163 F.3d 102,
110 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that IBM had no duty to update statements that the company had no
plans to cut the company's dividend because these were "vague expressions of opinion which are
not sufficiently concrete, specific or material to impose a duty to update").
175. Ann M. Lipton, Reviving Reliance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 91, 112 (2017).
176. See id. at 112-13 (discussing courts' presumption that investors disregard statements of
puffery); see also Ganino v. Citizens Utils. Co., 228 F.3d 154, 162 (2d Cir. 2000) (noting that puffery
applies to statements "so obviously unimportant to a reasonable investor that reasonable minds
could not differ" (quoting Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1067 (2d Cir. 1985)).
177. See Lipton, supra note 175, at 112 (noting that puffery is used to screen out claims "rooted
in objections to management's conduct, rather than based on deceptive behavior"); see also Santa
Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977) ("Congress by [Section] 10(b) did not seek to
regulate transactions which constitute no more than internal corporate mismanagement." (quoting
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971))).
178. See, e.g., In re Advanta Corp. Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 538 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting In re
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1428 n.14 (3d Cir. 1997)) ("[V]ague and general
statements of optimism 'constitute no more than "puffery" and are understood by the reasonable
investor as such.'").
179. Stransky v. Cummins Engine Co., 51 F.3d 1329, 1332 n.4 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that the
court "express[es] no opinion on whether the outcome would be the same if a plaintiff contested
statements of intent to take a certain action" as opposed to "statements that were predictions or
projections about [product] performance").
180. In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1427.
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181
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Time Warner
rejected by the courts."
held that statements "hyping strategic alliances" to raise needed capital
"lack the sort of definite positive projections that might require later"
updates and "suggest only the hope of any company, embarking on talks
18 2
with multiple partners, that the talks would go well."
These results should be unsurprising. As evidenced by

Burlington Coat Factory, it is a simple matter of accounting to verify
that net earnings grew at a faster rate than sales, while a mere
statement of optimism that such growth should happen is not an
assurance it will, much less a detailed plan of how to achieve it. 183 With
Time Warner in mind, statements about the seriousness of strategic
alliance discussions might imply a clear strategy-namely, which
strategy the company is exploring to raise capital. Yet in the absence of
further detail, such statements lack the information necessary to craft
verifiable expectations, such as the identity of potential partners, the
dates by which a deal will be struck, or the terms of any potential
deal. 184 In neither situation did the company's statement set forth clear
expectations of what was to arise, which could be subsequently verified.
185
after stripping away
In fact, like much of securities litigation,
discussions about disclosure duties and Rule 10b-5, these claims
revolved around investors' understandable disappointment at what

transpired, not deviations from a clearly defined strategy or target
186

outlined by the company's managers.
In contrast to those examples, statements setting forth clear,
verifiable expectations might warrant an update when circumstances

181. Id.
182. ZVI Trading Corp. Emps.' Money Purchase Pension Plan & Tr. v. Ross (In re Time Warner
Inc. Sec. Litig.), 9 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 1993).
183. In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1427 ("The forward-looking portion of
the statement here is a general, non-specific statement of optimism or hope that a trend
will continue.").
184. See In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 267 ("The statements suggest only the hope of any
company, embarking on talks with multiple partners, that the talks would go well. No identified
defendant stated that he thought deals would be struck by a certain date, or even that it was likely
that deals would be struck at all.").
185. Cf. Lipton, supra note 175, at 112 (arguing that claims dismissed on puffery grounds are
often situations where "bad news was announced, attorneys searched for false statements, and,
frequently in the absence of anything more concrete, seized upon banal, vaguely optimistic
representations").
186. See In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1414 (noting that the lawsuit was brought
after the company announced that its fourth quarter and full fiscal-year results for 1994 were
below the market's expectations and that a 30% decline in the company's stock price accompanied
the announcement); In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 262 (noting that the company's announcement
of strategic partnerships that were smaller than expected was followed by a decline in the
company's stock price from $117 to $94).
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change. In SEC v. Shattuck Denn Mining Corp.,187 one of the earliest
cases to recognize a duty to update claim, 188 a mining company
announced that negotiations over a proposed purchase of an oil refining
company had concluded favorably, which "undoubtedly led the
investing public to believe [the acquisition] was imminent." 189 A
subsequent breakdown in negotiations rendered the announcement, in
the court's eyes, "true when made" but "false and misleading shortly
thereafter." 90 Despite the statement's accuracy when issued, the court
ruled that the company's failure "to correct the 'misleading impression
left by statements already made'" violated section 10(b)'s antifraud
provisions. 19 1 Unlike the statements about strategic alliances in Time
Warner, Shattuck's statements provided investors both the identity of
the strategic partner and the "imminent" timing of the deal's
finalization. With this information, there was a clear expectation that
a deal would actually be finalized, which could be subsequently verified
by such a deal materializing shortly thereafter.
In the Quaker Oats, Co. example discussed above, the court held
that Quaker Oats' repeated statement that it would adhere to a
specified debt-equity ratio could require an update once Quaker Oats
began quietly discussing a debt-financed acquisition that would have
materially increased its debt-equity ratio beyond the assured limit. 192
Despite both disputes revolving around financial indicators, Quaker
Oats, Co. is distinguishable from Burlington Coat Factory. In
particular, a hope or belief that net earnings will grow faster than sales
is different from an assurance that the company will not exceed a
specified debt-equity ratio as an ongoing matter. The latter situation
presents both a clear expectation and an opportunity to verify.
3. Fundamental Changes
Lastly, courts have been generally unwilling to impose an
obligation to update a statement detached from a fundamental change
or long-term strategy. This rationale likely follows from the
requirement that statements be "alive" in the minds of investors. Even

187. 297 F. Supp. 470, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
188. See Brill, supra note 159, at 620 (noting that Shattuck is one of the two "earliest cases
addressing the duty to update"); Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 139, at 1665 (noting same).
189. See Shattuck, 297 F. Supp. at 475.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 476 (quoting Cochran v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1962)).
While framed as a "duty to correct," the emphasis on statements that were true when issued but
deemed inaccurate or misleading due to subsequent events aligns Shattuck with modern duty to
update, not duty to correct, case law. See Brill, supranote 159, at 620-22.
192. Weiner v. Quaker Oats, Co., 129 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 1997).
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if a statement has forward-looking implications and sets concrete

expectations, it is naturally more likely to stay "alive"-and impact
investor behavior-if it pertains to a classic fundamental transaction
193
Accordingly, the Third Circuit
like a merger or a long-term strategy.
reasoned, albeit in dicta, that "the duty to update, to the extent it might
exist, would be a narrow one to update the public as to extreme changes
in the company's originally expressed expectation of an event such as a
194
takeover, merger, or liquidation."
While the Second Circuit dismissed a duty to update claim
focusing on solutions to a debt problem in Time Warner, the court
nevertheless reasoned that an issuer may possess such an obligation to
update a prior statement about a proposed solution to the fundamental
debt problem to the extent that other approaches were being actively
explored. 195 Along those same lines, the Third Circuit held in Quaker

Oats, Co. that prior statements pledging to adhere to a debt-equity ratio
required an update that the company was pursuing an undisclosed
19 6
The court determined
merger that would have violated that pledge.
to expect that
investor
a
reasonable
led
have
would
that the statements
197
change."
company to announce "any anticipated significant
C. Materiality
As alluded to above, even if there is an implied duty to disclose
under Rule 10b-5, disclosure is still not required unless the statement
is deemed "material." Theoretically, the two concepts-materiality and
duty-can be separated. Materiality asks the factual question of
whether "reasonable investors" would find the piece of information at
issue important when considered among all the information available

193. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 139, at 1644 ("If the information at issue is extremely
important-for example, involving a major change in a company's fortunes, such as a mergerthen courts seem comfortable finding a duty to update the initial announcement."); Brill, supra
note 159, at 665 ("The basis for [the duty to update] ... must 'be that the projection contained an
implicit factual representation that remained "alive" in the minds of investors as a continuing
representation.' " (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1432 (3d
Cir. 1997)).
194. In re Burlington Coat Factory, 114 F.3d at 1434 n.20.
195. See ZVI Trading Corp. Emps.' Money Purchase Pension Plan & Tr. v. Ross (In re Time
Warner Inc. Sec. Litig.), 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[We hold that when a corporation is
pursuing a specific business goal and announces that goal as well as an intended approach for
reaching it, it may come under an obligation to disclose other approaches to reaching the goal when
those approaches are under active and serious consideration.").
196. See Weiner, 129 F.3d at 318 (3d Cir. 1997) (reasoning that it would have been clear to the
company that the proposed merger would require the company to take on debt far higher than that
in the pledge and that these facts would be material to a reasonable investor).
197. Id. at 317.
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to them 198 while duty asks the legal question of whether the company
had an obligation to disclose the information at issue. 199 In practice, the
distinction is murky at best, 2 00 and some have argued that the

disclosure duty analysis is largely unnecessary in light of the
mandatory

disclosure

obligations

and

the

existing

materiality

requirement. 20 1 Further, materiality is at least implicitly a part of the
duty analysis, including for the duty to update:
For example, take the duty to update, which at least some courts have articulated as being
a function of investor expectations . . . . If the information at issue is extremely
important-for example, involving a major change in a company's fortunes, such as a
merger-then courts seem comfortable finding a duty to update the initial
announcement.

202

Thus, any attempt to apply the duty to update requires consideration of
materiality as well.
Materiality in the context of climate disclosures is a slowly
developing area of the law. This is due, in part, to the reality that the

SEC and courts have largely eschewed the discussion. For its part, the
SEC, in its 2010 guidance on climate risk disclosures, merely cited the
applicability of existing definitions of materiality, providing little
guidance on how those definitions apply to climate risk or climaterelated matters. 20 3 This lack of clarity-along with minimal

198. Id. at 316; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) ("[T]o fulfill the
materiality requirement there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted
fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total
mix of information made available." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
199. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 139, at 1644; see also Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v.
Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 44-45 (2011) (holding there is no "affirmative duty to disclose any and all
material information" and that "[e]ven with respect to information that a reasonable investor
might consider material, companies can control what they have to disclose . . . by controlling what
they say to the market").
200. See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 139, at 1643-44 ("In court opinions on the fraud
question, it is often hard to determine whether the judge is basing her decision on materiality
or duty.").
201. See Matthew C. Turk & Karen E. Woody, The Leidos Mixup and the Misunderstood Duty
to Disclose in Securities Law, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 957, 1032 (2018) (arguing that the duty to
disclose analysis serves no "independent role in the legal analysis" aside from merely restate
asking whether there is a statutory obligation to disclose); see also Robert H. Rosenblum, An
Issuer's Duty Under Rule 10b-5 to Correct and Update Materially Misleading Statements, 40 CATH.
U. L. REV. 289, 293 (1991) (reasoning that the standard tests for when there is a duty to disclose
are "circular"). But see Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 139, at 1643-44 (arguing that it is
important to analyze duty to disclose separately from materiality).
202. Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 139, at 1644.
203. Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, Securities Act
Release No. 33-9106, Exchange Act Release No. 34-61469, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6292-93, 6295 (Feb.
8, 2010).
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205
resulted in low-quality climate disclosures.

Despite calls for supplementing or overhauling the 2010 Climate
Guidance, 206 as recently as January 2020, the SEC has signaled little
20 7
interest in revisiting the matter.
Courts have similarly provided minimal guidance on the
materiality of climate-related information. One of the few cases to
engage with this issue is Ramirez v. Exxon Mobil Corp., which centered

on Exxon Mobil's use of two different proxy costs of carbon, one disclosed

208
Rejecting a motion to
to the public and one internal and undisclosed.
dismiss, the court determined that a reasonable investor would likely
find it significant that Exxon Mobil used an internal proxy cost of
2 09
The court further
carbon lower than its publicly disclosed proxy cost.
cost of carbon
proxy
its
include
to
determined that the company's failure
in an impairment determination-allegedly in violation of GAAP
2 10
accounting protocols-could make its opinion materially misleading.
The Ramirez decision stands in contrast with People v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., a New York state court decision on Exxon Mobil's use of multiple

204. See Hana V. Vizcarra, Climate-Related Disclosure and Litigation Risk in the Oil & Gas
Industry: Will State Attorneys General Investigations Impede the Drive for More Expansive
Disclosures?, 43 VT. L. REV. 733, 756 (2019) ("SEC staff sent a handful of comment letters to
companies about their climate-related disclosures (25 letters to 23 companies from 2010 to 2013
out of more than 45,000 comment letters and 14 letters to 14 companies out of over 41,000 letters
issued from 2014 to 2017)." (citing U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-18-188, CLIMATERELATED RISKS: SEC HAS TAKEN STEPS TO CLARIFY DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS 14 (2018))).

205. One analysis of six hundred publicly traded companies notes that, despite an increase in
climate-related disclosure between 2014 and 2017 (from 42% to 51%), such disclosures were largely
"boilerplate language" that gave investors little "decision-useful information." See KRISTEN LANG,
JACOB ROBINSON & AMY AUGUSTINE, CERES, TURNING POINT: CORPORATE PROGRESS ON THE CERES
ROADMAP FOR SUSTAINABILITY: 2018 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 (Meaghan Parker ed., 2018),

22
75 [https://perma.cc/CQP5-8NYM]; see also Robert Repetto, It's Time
https://www.ceres.org/node/
Disclosure Rules, INT'L INST. SUSTAINABLE DEV. (Mar. 23, 2016),
Climate
Its
the SEC Enforced
[https://perma.cc/
https://www.iisd.org/articles/its-time-sec-enforced-its-climate-disclosure-rules
5MKN-VDNM] (noting that most reporting companies "have taken refuge in future uncertainties
to avoid more explicit quantitative statements of potential financial impacts, even when the
company had intensively studied potential impacts under plausible future scenarios").
206. See Jill E. Fisch, supra note 12, at 940 (noting that despite receiving "tens of thousands
of comments on sustainability disclosure," with many calling for annual, uniform reporting, the
SEC has not acted on those requests); see also Che Odom, Investors Want Sustainability
21, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.bna.com/
Disclosures in SEC Overhaul, BLOOMBERG L. (July
99
("Investor
[https://perma.cc/RG6G-4857]
/
investors-sustainability-disclosures-n730144450
advocates are making a strong push for the SEC to require annual, uniform sustainability
reporting from public companies as part of the overhaul of the agency's disclosure regime.").
207. See Jane E. Montgomery, SEC Indicates It Will Not Modify Climate Change Disclosure
Criteria, NAT'L L. REV. (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/sec-indicates-it-willchair
("[T]he
[https://perma.cc/2J3W-AD4V]
not-modify-climate-change-disclosure-criteria
reiterated a 'principles-based' approach to disclosure and specifically referenced the [2010 Climate
Guidance] as providing sufficient guidance to companies.").
208. 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 840-41 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
209. Id. at 846.
210. Id. at 848.
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proxy costs. 21 1 In that case, the court ruled that "[n]o reasonable
investor during the period from 2013 to 2016 would make investment

decisions based on speculative assumptions of costs that may be
incurred 20+ or 30+ years in the future with respect to unidentified
future projects"-essentially deeming the proxy costs immaterial. 212

With only two substantive

decisions,

each reaching a different

conclusion, it is difficult to piece together a judicial doctrine on the
materiality of climate-related information like ERTs.

Yet this lack of regulatory and judicial consensus makes sense
when considering the fact that climate-related information has only
recently become a topic of obsession among private actors. 213 Why would
the SEC promulgate a rule mandating disclosure of carbon emissions

before it was reasonably sure the markets actually cared about
emissions information? One proposed framework-created by Jean
Rogers of SASB and Professor George Serafeim and David Freiberg of
Harvard Business School-attempts to model this transition from
immaterial to material. 2 14 The framework identifies five stages through
which sustainability information becomes financially material: (1) the
status quo, (2) catalyst events, (3) stakeholder reaction, (4) company
reaction, and (5) regulatory reaction. 2 15 Under this framework, ERTs
demonstrate a move into the fourth stage ("company reaction"), where
"[c]ompanies attempt to regain trust through company-specific or
industry self-regulation," and "[n]ew norms and beliefs are set for
industry behavior." 2 16 Further, the misalignment between business and
societal interests begins to shrink, as evidenced by the proliferation of
ERTs across an increasing number of industries. 2 17 This framework is
assuredly not the legal standard for materiality, but it does indicate
that climate disclosures-of which ERTs are surely a part-are viewed
as material by the market, even if the SEC and courts have not reached
that conclusion yet. It also indicates that a new legal standard may not
be far off.2 18

211. See People v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 452044/2018, 2019 WL 675771 at *1-2 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Dec. 10, 2019).
212. Id. at *34.
213. See supra Section l.A.
214. See David Freiberg, Jean Rogers & George Serafeim, How ESG Issues Become Financially
Materialto Corporationsand Their Investors 3 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 20-056, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3482546 [https://perma.cc/DM4Q-79GD].
215. Id. at 6.
216. Id. at 9.
217. Id.
218. In fact, the Biden Administration has indicated that improved climate-related reporting
will be one of the SEC's top priorities. See Kirstin K. Gruver, Leah A. Dundon & Megan L. Morgan,
Climate Risk Disclosures Face Increased Scrutiny and Potential Change to Reporting
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D. The Effect of CautionaryLanguage
As one might expect, cautionary language may place a damper

on any duty to update claim; investors may be less likely to expect a
forward-looking statement to come to fruition when presented with all
the ways it may not. In fact, any discussion of forward-looking
statements under federal securities law will inevitably raise the specter
of the Private Securities Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"). Underneath its
larger purpose of reining in securities litigation, the PSLRA sought to
encourage the dissemination of forward-looking statements by
219
This safe harbor
affording a safe harbor for such statements.
(1) the statement
if
statement
precludes liability for a forward-looking

is "accompanied by meaningful cautionary statements identifying
important factors that could cause actual results to differ materially
from those in the forward-looking statement"; (2) the statement is
immaterial; or (3) the plaintiff fails to prove that the statement was
"made with actual knowledge . . . that the statement was false or
misleading." 220 After defining the safe harbor, the PSLRA then states
that "[n]othing in this section shall impose upon any person a duty to
221
update a forward-looking statement."
222
SEC filings,
Companies take this safe harbor seriously.
corporate sustainability reports, and press releases on climate
initiatives often include-at the behest of counsel-cautionary
language regarding forward-looking statements. 223 For example,

Requirements, NAT. L. REV. (Mar. 10, 2021), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/climate-riskdisclosures -face-increased-scrutiny-and-potential-change-to-reporting#:~:text=Chmate%20Risk
2
%20Disclosure%20Act%20f,out%20climate%20risk%20disClosure% 0rules [https://perma.cc/VU
Z7-TM4M].
219. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1); Richard A. Rosen, The Statutory Safe Harbor for ForwardLooking Statements After Two and a Half Years: Has It Changed the Law? Has It Achieved What
Congress Intended?, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 645, 646 (1998) ("The single greatest impetus to passage of
the Reform Act was the perception-amply supported by the evidence-that issuers had been
deterred from making projections and from disseminating soft information because of a fear of
liability if their public statements failed accurately to predict the future.").
220. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1). This safe harbor can be viewed as a codification of the judicial
bespeaks caution doctrine, which holds that "contemporaneous cautionary statements can
counteract the effect of a forward-looking statement in the overall mix of information, and can
render a forward-looking statement immaterial as a matter of law." Porter, supra note 17, at 2250.
221. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(d).
222. See Ann Morales Olaz.bal, False Forward-Looking Statements and the PSLRA's Safe
Harbor, 86 IND. L.J. 595, 597-98 (2011) ("Now, a decade and a half since the enactment of the
PSLRA, so-called safe harbor 'warnings' are a standard feature of issuers' periodic reports and
other communications in which they disseminate such soft information .... ").
223. See Alexandra N. Farmer, Michael Mahoney & Donna H. Ni, Making and Keeping
Corporate Climate Commitments: Part 1, KIRKLAND & ELLIS (Aug. 11, 2020), https://www.
kirkland. com/publications/article/2020/08/making-keeping-corporate-climate-commitments_pt-1
[https://perma.cc/ND4R-W7X6] ("Climate goals should be carefully drafted so as to be aspirational
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Chevron's 2019 sustainability report, which encompasses its 2023

emissions and emissions intensity reduction targets, includes a long
"forward-looking statements warning" that states such "statements are
not guarantees of future performance and are subject to certain risks,
uncertainties and other factors, many of which are beyond the

company's control and are difficult to predict." 224

This safe harbor must leave any duty to update argument dead
in the water, right? The answer is not as clear cut as it appears for a

couple reasons. First, there is debate as to whether the PSLRAparticularly the language "[n]othing in this section shall impose upon
any person a duty to update a forward-looking statement"-supersedes
the judicial duty to update. 225 Simply by its text, the safe harbor merely

says it does not independently create a duty to update, while remaining
silent on its effect on the existing judicial duty to update doctrine.
Under this interpretation, an issuer, while protected by the statutory

safe harbor, may still be able to independently violate a duty to update
a forward-looking statement if the jurisdiction recognizes that duty. 226
On the other hand, some academics have argued that this language,
alongside the creation of a safe harbor that expressly disclaims liability,
is clearly an attempt by Congress to eliminate the duty. 227 This latter
argument appears to track the Seventh Circuit's rationale for rejecting
a duty to update. 228
Second, the safe harbor may not always be available, thus
potentially leaving the duty to update as a backstop. The forwardlooking statement must be accompanied by "meaningful cautionary
statements identifying important factors that could cause actual results
to differ materially from those in the forward-looking statement." 229 The
application of any legal definition to a set of facts inevitably leaves
ample discretion to the courts, which is equally true when it comes to
and estimates of future performance, and not material commitments upon which an investor could
be reasonably expected to rely.... [D]isclaimers regarding forward-looking statements or
estimates should be considered.").
224. CHEVRON, surpa note 97, at 47.
225. See, e.g., Porter, supra note 17, at 2249 ("The Act does not indicate an intention to
eliminate any duty to update that may have existed independently from the Reform Act. As such,
the better argument is that this section of the Reform Act does not have any impact on the duty
to update.").
226. See Brill, supra note 159, at 651, 678 (explaining that a duty to update exists but that
some jurisdictions decline to recognize that duty).
227. See Porter, supranote 17, at 2250 ("Although the Reform Act would not literally eliminate
a duty to update those forward-looking statements that do not fall within the provision of the
Reform Act, eliminating the duty to update entirely would seem consistent with the goals of the
Reform Act.").
228. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Centel Corp., 113 F.3d 738, 746 (7th Cir. 1997) (suggesting that
the PSLRA may preclude duty to update claims).
229. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2(c)(1)(A)(i).
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cautionary language. Courts generally require cautionary language to
be "substantive and tailored" to the forward-looking statement at
issue. 230 Boilerplate statements or generalized warnings are typically
insufficient. 231 Turning back to ERTs, cautionary language that does
not sufficiently identify why a company may not be able to attain the
specificized emissions reductions-whether due to limitations of supply
chain contracting, scalability problems with carbon removal, or
unanticipated increases in output that lead to increases in emissionsmay not be able to avoid judicial scrutiny. Therefore, the applicability
of the PSLRA safe harbor is, at least in part, in the control of the issuer

and the courts, if it reaches litigation.
III. THE INTERSECTION OF ERTS AND THE DUTY TO UPDATE

As Section I.D highlighted, unfulfilled ERTs, absent an update
to the market, pose a threat to investors, who may be misled about the
company's progress or success in achieving an ERT, as well as to the
securities markets in general, as stock prices may not reflect the
fundamental long-term value of the issuer. In light of these potential
problems and the absence of SEC regulation, a judicial backstop is
needed, at least as a stopgap until SEC action, in order to protect
investors and safeguard market efficiency. This Note proposes using the
duty to update as that backstop.

A. The Duty to Update as a JudicialStopgap for Unfulfilled ERTs
1. ERTs Are "Alive" in the Minds of Investors
At the outset, ERTs can be distinguished from the historical
232
These
facts to which courts are hesitant to apply the duty to update.
commitments are not financial statements or statements about the
company's present climate performance. Rather, ERTs indicate to the

market that the company will reach certain benchmarks by a specified
date. The veracity of the statements cannot be assessed at the time of
230. See, e.g., Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 372 (5th Cir. 2004)
("The requirement for 'meaningful' cautions calls for 'substantive' company-specific warnings
based on a realistic description of the risks applicable to the particular circumstances, not merely
a boilerplate litany of generally applicable risk factors.").
231. See, e.g., Ark. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Harman Int'l Indus., Inc. (In re Harman Int'l Indus.,
Inc. Sec. Litig.), 791 F.3d 90, 102 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ("[M]ere boilerplate-'This is a forward-looking
statement: caveat emptor'--does not meet the statutory standard because by its nature it is
general and ubiquitous, not tailored to the specific circumstances of a business operation, and not
of 'useful quality.'" (quoting Asher v. Baxter Int'l Inc., 377 F.3d 727, 729 (7th Cir. 2004))).
232. See, e.g., Finnerty v. Stiefel Lab'ys, Inc., 756 F.3d 1310, 1317 (11th Cir. 2014) ('There is,
of course, no obligation to update a prior statement about a historical fact.").
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issuance, thus creating a continuing representation-at least until the
deadline is reached-and some implicit assurance of an update.
Further, in contrast to the external market factors that may render

financial projections incongruent with a duty to update, 233 ERTs largely
pertain to the internal operations within the control of the company,

such as the decision to procure power from solar farms as opposed to
coal-fired power plants or the extent to which a company enforces
emissions reduction requirements in its supply chain contracts. This
level of internal control makes it more reasonable that investors will
want to be appraised of progress towards or deviation from an ERT.
This rationale is akin to the rationale adopted in Quaker Oats,
Co. The company had made a firm guideline about adherence to a debt-

equity ratio, thereby encouraging investors to expect adherence to that
ratio. 234 The court found a duty to update because Quaker Oats' quiet
acquisition would have rendered that guideline meaningless, thus
violating its investors' reliance interests. 2 35 The Ninth Circuit found a
similar situation in Khoja, where investors were informed of a drug
testing schedule and given preliminary results; these investors

reasonably expected to be informed if the company intended to deviate
from this schedule. 236
In a similar vein, an ERT provides a defined target to attain or
maintain-much like a debt-equity ratio-and a deadline for
achievement-much like a drug testing schedule. It therefore makes
sense for investors to assume a company would adhere to its ERT and
integrate it into its ongoing business plans, especially given how

aggressive many ERTs have become. In sum, once the company releases
an ERT and a projected timetable for fulfillment, it creates long-term
expectations in the minds of the company's investors, and deviations

should be disclosed accordingly.
2. ERTs Set Clear, Verifiable Expectations
Secondly, ERTs contain numerical benchmarks and defined

timelines that set clear and verifiable expectations about the expected
emissions reductions. 237 ERTs clearly communicate (1) what percentage
or amount of a company's total emissions are being reduced, (2) the
233. See, e.g., In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1432-33 (3d Cir. 1997)
(concluding that "we do not think it can be said that an ordinary earnings projection contains an
implicit representation on the part of the company that it will update the investing public with all
material information that relates to that forecast").
234. Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 312-14 (3d Cir. 1997).
235. Id.
236. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 1015 (9th Cir. 2018).
237. See supraSection I.B.
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potential availability of offsets in lieu of reductions, (3) whether the

ERTs pertain to absolute emissions or intensity, and (4) the deadline
for achievement. With these expectations, fulfillment becomes less a
matter of speculation and hope and more a matter of accounting. If a
company pledges to cut its absolute scope 1 emissions by 50% by 2030,
based on a 2015 baseline, then verification is a matter of calculation: If
the company cuts scope 1 emissions by 50%, the expectations are
satisfied. If the company fails to make sufficient cuts, then the

expectations are not satisfied. Market actors and investors therefore
know precisely what information is necessary to verify achievementnamely, emissions data disclosed on an annual or semiannual basisand, in turn, what information they should expect to be disclosed.
This contrasts with many of the vague statements for which
courts have declined to find a duty to update. "Active and serious"
discussions 283 or "general, non-specific statement[s] of optimism or hope
239
are ill-defined and do not provide
that a trend will continue"
rely upon. In essence, these
reasonably
to
investors
for
substance
240
find a statement misleading
to
difficult
is
It
statements are puffery.
when it is hard to even ascertain where it is leading you. As discussed
above, ERTs do not suffer from this problem.

This factor

highlights one key way

to

avoid even the

contemplation of liability under a duty to update: public, periodic
disclosure of accurate, audited emissions data. While providing
investors with periodic reports about progress towards an ERT-much
like how Kraft Heinz updated investors about the nonfulfillment of its
ERT 241-would sidestep a judicially imposed duty to update, disclosure
of actual emissions data could accomplish the same result. Investors
and market actors are capable of calculating the progress, or lack

thereof, if they are given the relevant emissions data for the baseline
year and for the years subsequent to issuance of the ERT. The
Bloomberg analysis discussed earlier used corporate emissions data to
determine the progress of its sample of ERTs, but the authors noted

that it lacked the emissions data to assess 17 of the 187 ERTs it
238. See ZVI Trading Corp. Emps.' Money Purchase Pension Plan & Tr. v. Ross (In re Time
Warner Inc. Sec. Litig.), 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir. 1993) ("Rather, we hold that when a corporation
is pursuing a specific business goal and announces that goal as well as an intended approach for
reaching it, it may come under an obligation to disclose other approaches to reaching the goal when
those approaches are under active and serious consideration.").
239. See In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1427-28 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that a representation that the company "believe[d] [it could] continue to grow net earnings
at a faster rate than sales," was too general (alterations in original)).
240. See Lipton, supra note 175, at 112-13 (discussing courts' presumption that investors
disregard statements of puffery).
241. See Querolo, supra note 103.
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analyzed. 242 Moreover, consistent disclosure would adjust the
expectations of investors, who now expect annual or semi-annual
disclosures in order to track ERT progress.
3. ERTs Pertain to Fundamental Changes in Many Industries

ERTs are

admittedly

not a traditional

example

of the

"fundamental change" contemplated in the duty to update case law,
such as a merger or acquisition. 243 Yet as Section I.C discussed, ERTs,
as with any decarbonization strategy, often require an overhaul to a
company's day-to-day business. This may take the form of installing
new board members or board committees, integrating ERTs into
executive compensation, altering the valuation of particular projects,
overhauling how power is procured, and/or making investments in
expensive but unproven CCS or removal technologies. 244
Further, and possibly more importantly, many ERTs require
changes to companies' profitmaking components. For example, an oil
major that pledges to achieve net zero emissions may need to shift
resources away from carbon-intensive oil and gas extraction and
processing-traditionally a high-profit business unit in the industry
and into renewable energy production. Or it may need to implement
aggressive internal carbon pricing, which will inevitably diminish the
profits expected from its oil and gas business units. Or it may need to

divert revenue from its oil and gas segments into CCS and carbon
removal technologies, which may balloon in cost over time. Similarly, a
utility company-which derives revenue from the generation and sale
of electricity-may pledge to shift at least 50% of its energy generation
portfolio from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources. 245 This shift,
given the need to decommission, likely prematurely, carbon-intensive
projects and invest heavily in renewable projects, would clearly affect
the company's capital planning as well as the prices it will need to
charge its end consumers, who may balk at high prices.
The above discussion highlights how aggressive ERTs will likely
require a company to overhaul its business model and its derivation of
revenue. It is likely that investors would want to remain apprised of

242. See
243. See
acquisition);
244. See

Gillespie et al., supranote 101.
Weiner v. Quaker Oats Co., 129 F.3d 310, 312-13 (3d Cir. 1997) (concerning an
In re Time Warner, 9 F.3d at 267 (concerning a merger).
supraSection I.C (discussing potential steps for reducing emissions).

245. See S. Co., CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY REPORT 2018 4-5 (2019), https://www.southern

company.com/content/dam/southern-company/pdf/corpresponsibility/2018_Corporate_
ResponsibilityReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/3B5C-ZK77].
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whether or not these fundamental changes are leading to achievement

of particular climate goals.
B. Normative Arguments for a Judicial Remedy
Even if the duty to update is doctrinally applicable to ERTs, the
question remains whether judicially imposed liability is a preferred
outcome. This is a valid concern, as even the risk of increased liability
may deter companies from making emissions pledges in the first place,
thereby making it even harder to stave off the worst effects of climate
change. Further, regulatory intervention on the front end, rather than
judicial intervention on the back end, may be preferable, as it provides

ample notice and consistency to issuers.
For this inquiry, it may be helpful to draw upon a "tort thinking"
versus "property thinking" framework outlined by Professors Donald
2 46
As the two have argued, cases centered
Langevoort and Mitu Gulati.
on SEC mandatory line-item disclosures should be viewed as propertylike, where the SEC, utilizing its rulemaking authority and special
expertise on issues of fairness and efficiency, has granted investors
property-like entitlement to particular types of information. In essence,
SEC regulation creates investor expectations that companies will
247
In contrast, duty to
release those required sets of information.
disclose cases, absent a relevant line item, should be viewed as tort-like,
particularly where issuers have cultivated expectations through their
own actions and "omissions would likely mislead reasonable
investors." 248 As this Note has argued thus far, ERTs create such
expectations and reliance interests.
In these tort-like cases, judicial deference to questions of policy,
namely fairness and efficiency, should not automatically supersede
concerns over misleading disclosures that are not actively policed by the
SEC. 249 Rather, courts should be empowered to leverage their
institutional confidence to police forward-looking statements via the
duty to update, so long as the statements create expectations and invite
continued reliance. 250 When the SEC has essentially declined to act,
courts should feel empowered to ensure that investor protection does
not always take a backseat to abstract notions of market efficiency.
The need for judicial intervention may be even more acute in the
context of climate-related disclosures. Even though market actors are
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See Langevoort & Gulati, supra note 139, at 1645-46.
Id. at 1645, 1677-78.
Id. at 1645, 1678.
Id. at 1678.
Id.
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pressuring companies to disclose emissions and other climate-related
information, the existing disclosure regime, which is generally
voluntary, lacks sufficient standardization and gives companies ample,

if not too much, discretion on which types of information to disclose and
when to do so. 2 51 Importantly, there is little liability for voluntary
disclosures, as private standard setters lack such power and the SEC
has generally declined to pursue potential violations, which can place
investors, no matter the size of their investment, at the whims of
issuers. Thus, judicially imposed liability may be a necessary corrective

force, at least so long as the SEC declines to act.
CONCLUSION

Companies are publicly issuing ERTs at a borderline
exponential rate, setting investor expectations for private climate

action higher than ever. Yet these targets largely exist outside of SEC
mandated disclosures, which presents acute enforcement problems,
especially for investors seeking accurate disclosures. Injecting life into

the duty to update and applying the doctrine to ERTs is one possible
method of enforcement. While this may expose companies to liability or
additional disclosure obligations, the alternative is a market where
investors cannot determine which climate commitments are true and
which ones are ultimately misleading, therefore defeating the
overarching concept of an efficient market governed by uniform
disclosure laws. Furthermore, exposure to private liability may entice
companies to seek refuge in a more uniform regime for climate
disclosure and a certification framework for climate targets, a result
this author would happily support.
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251 See Fisch, supra note 12, at 947-52 (discussing the limitations of existing'
sustainability disclosures).
*
J.D. Candidate, 2021, Vanderbilt University Law School; B.S., 2018, University of
Alabama. I extend well-deserved thanks to Sam Baker, Alicia Hoke, Jen King, Patrick Perrier,
Aaron Rodgers, Emily Sheffield, and Anne-Sophie Tom6 for their tireless support and feedback
and for bearing with me while I wrote this Note. I also want to thank Henry Bator, Aaron Bernard,
Sarah Bourgeois, Austin Brown, Kyle Brinker, Paul d'Ambrosio, Erin Embrey, Caylyn Harvey, Joe
Hendricks, Liam Murphy, Lisa Orucevic, Jay Paolillo, Aaron Peterson, Fields Pierce, Meredith
Severtson, Bryan Teresi, Emily Webb, and the rest of the Vanderbilt Law Review staff for their
invaluable work, not only on this Note but for all of our published pieces this year.

***

